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IS IT MORALLY WRONG TO DEPEND

ON THE HONESTY OF YOUR PARTNER
OR SPOUSE? BANKRUPTCY
DISCHARGEABILITY OF
VIcARIOus DEBT
by Steven H. Resnicoff

Since early in this century, discharge of debts incurred vicariously has been governed by conflicting precedents. The author
examines these cases in light of the policies underlying the current
Bankruptcy Code and its statutory antecedents, then analyzes the
impact of the rule developed in the case law on debtors in varying
situations. In particular,the author critically examines the impact
of judicially-fashionedrules denying discharge to debtors based on
fraudulent actions by the-debtors' spouses.
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INTRODUCTION
American bankruptcy law promotes its principal policy of
allowing individuals to escape the financial and emotional burden
of past debt by discharging prior economic liabilities.1 For over a
hundred years courts have agreed that debts are presumptively
dischargeable2 and that statutory exceptions to discharge3 must be

1. See HR. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., IstSess. 125, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6086. "The purpose of straight bankruptcy . .. is to obtain a fresh start, free from
creditor harassment and free from the worries and pressures of too much debt." See also
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (noting that bankruptcy "gives to the
honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt" (citations
omitted)); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (stating that the Bankruptcy Act relieves "the honest citizen [from] the burden of hopeless insolvency"); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Foreman (In re Foreman), 906 F.2d 123, 127 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding "overarching policy
in the Bankruptcy Code in favor of giving the debtor an opportunity for a fresh start . . .
"); Chevy Chase F.S.B. v. Hable (In re Hable), 107 B.R. 356, 358 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1989) ("The entire bankruptcy scheme was designed in part to give debtors a fresh start
in life, free and unencumbered from pressing debts so they could become useful members
of society." (citations omitted)); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.L 763, 785-786 (1983) ("One reason for giving the debtor a fresh start
is to counteract the self-hatred he may feel, having mortgaged his entire future in a series
of past decisions he now regrets. Whatever its macroeconomic function, the bankruptcy
discharge has a moral purpose as well ... ." (footnote omitted)).
The concept of a discharge of debt is not inherent to a bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy could be envisioned as merely an efficient, equitable mechanism for distributing a
debtor's assets. Furthermore, there is no constitutional right to a discharge. United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973). However, as a legislatively created benefit, the availability of a discharge is now commonly regarded as an essential element of American
bankruptcy law. Id. at 446-447 (discussing historical development of discharge policy).
Commentators have vigorously discussed policy bases for particular discharge rules.
See generally, THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrTs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225252 (1986) (arguing bankruptcy's fresh start policy is largely limited to protection of
human capital, not property); Charles G. Hallinan, The 'Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer
Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and An Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49,
53 (1986) (asserting the necessity of understanding that discharge rights may be explained
as a compulsory allocation of risk associated with consumer credit in order to apply and
interpret the code); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48
OHIo ST. L.. 1047, 1069-70 (1987) (advocating a functional economic theory of discharge which proposes discharge be widely available so that debtors may participate in an
open credit economy); Frank R. Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427, 434-45 (1974) (reviewing the history of discharge in English and American law).
2. See, e.g., Neal, 95 U.S. at 709 (arguing that equity and Congressional intent demand liberal construction of bankruptcy law); Foreman, 906 F.2d at 126 (holding that an
insurance company seeking repayment of worker's compensation benefits bears the burden
of showing that a debt is nondischargeable); California State Bank v. Lauricella (In re
Lauricella), 105 BR. 536, 541 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the debtor's conduct
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in signing checks while intoxicated was not sufficiently wrongful under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) to deny discharge); Schweig v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 780 F.2d 1577, 1579
(11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the burden is on a creditor to prove that the debtor made
affirmative misrepresentations placing debt within exception to Bankruptcy law); Tropical
Exploration Corp., Inc. v. McCoy (In re McCoy), 121 B.R. 637, 640 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (stating that the burden rests with a creditor to establish that the debtor was acting
in a fiduciary capacity); Household Bank, N.A. v. Touchard (In re Touchard), 121 B.R.
397, 401 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) (requiring the plaintiff to prove elements of
nondischargeability for false pretenses and false representation); Hable, 107 B.R. at 358
(placing the burden on a creditor to establish elements of a claim of nondischargeability);
see also Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979) (applying the presumption that all
debts are dischargeable unless specifically excepted); Driggs v. Black (In re Black), 787
F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding a presumption under § 523(a) that debts are not
the result of fraud); Long v. West (In re Long), 794 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a party challenging dischargeability has the burden of showing that debt falls
within the alimony exception to dischargeability).
The Supreme Court has recently determined that the burden of proof standard in all
§ 523(a) cases is preponderance of the evidence. Grogan v. Gamer, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659
(1991) (applying preponderance standard to all § 523(a) exceptions, even though case
involved only § 523(a)(2)); Hoskins v. Yanks, 931 F.2d 42, 43 (11th Cir. 1991) (construing Grogan as applying to all § 523(a) exceptions and applying it to § 523(a)(6));
Texas Am. Bank v. Barron (In re Barron), 126 B.R. 255, 258 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991)
("Mhe Supreme Court's recent decision in Grogan v. Garner... categorically holds that
the preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate in all 11 U.S.C. § 523
dischargeability matters."). Prior to Grogan, the cases had been in complete disarray. The
acknowledged importance of the policy favoring discharge had led the majority of lower
courts to rule that, at least in some situations, a creditor would have to satisfy a "clear
and convincing evidence" standard. See, e.g., In re Weber, 892 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that a clear and convincing standard applies to § 523(a)(4)); Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a clear and
convincing test applies to § 523(a)(6)); Knoxville Teachers Credit Union v. Parkey, 790
F.2d 490, 491 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a clear and convincing applies to
§ 523(a)(2)(A)). But see, e.g., Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a preponderance of evidence test applies to § 523(a)(6)); Century Surety Ins.
Co. v. Rainer (In re Rainer), 108 B.R. 184, 186 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that a
preponderance test applies to § 523(a)(4)). For a more comprehensive list of cases and
discussion of the creditor's burden of proof, see ROBERT E. GINSBERG, BANKRUPTCY
§ 11.07[d] (2nd ed. 1989). For a discussion of the difference between the two standards,
see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 728 (1989).
3. The Bankruptcy Code enumerates exceptions where a court may deny a global discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). Most exceptions involve purposeful debtor misconduct
tending to subvert the bankruptcy process. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2)-(7). Discharge obtained under chapters 11, 12 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code also requires a reorganization plan be confirmed and at least substantially performed. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b)(4), (7),
1208(c)(3)-(8), 1307(c).
Even if a general discharge is granted, the Code prohibits the discharge of certain
debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 523. Whether a particular debt is nondischargeable depends upon
the bankruptcy chapter in which the debtor is proceeding. An exhaustive list of
nondischargeable debts appears in 11 U.S.C. § 523, which applies to chapters 7, 11 and
12 and to some chapter 13 cases. Nondischargeable debts include taxes, alimony, child
support, certain tort damages, government-guaranteed education loans, and fraudulently
obtained debts. Id. In other chapter 13 cases, most of these kinds of debts are discharge-
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narrowly construed in order to afford comprehensive relief to honest debtors.4
Although courts consistently emphasize that protection by discharge was designed to aid the "honest citizen" or "honest debtor,"
judicial decisions do not provide a comprehensive definition of
those terms. One basic premise of this article is that a debtor who
is vicariously responsible for a debt obtained by fraud, but who did
not directly participate in the fraud on the creditor, is an "honest
debtor." s
Whether a debt is discharged is of critical importance to both
debtor and creditor.6 The importance to unsecured creditors is obvious; if the discharge is granted, these creditors ordinarily go unpaid. The disproportionate amount of court time devoted to
dischargeability litigation reflects the stakes at risk for all parties.
One recent study indicates that dischargeability proceedings under
Section 523 consume approximately twenty-seven percent of the
time bankruptcy judges devote to "case-related" matters and over
sixteen percent of their total "work-related" hours.7
Some exceptions to discharge apply to debtors proved guilty
of certain forms of normatively repugnant conduct,' such as fraud
or willful and malicious injury.9 Surprisingly, there is relatively

able. 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
4. See, e.g., Neal, 95 U.S. at 709 (stating that the purpose of the law is to relieve
honest debtors from the burden of debt); Evans v. Dunston (In re Dunston), 117 B.R.
632, 636 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (noting that the "[c]ourt must narrowly construe exceptions to discharge against the creditor and in favor of the debtor" (citations omitted));
Cardenas v. Stowell (In re Stowell), 113 B.R. 322 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); Hable, 107
B.R. at 357, 358 ("It is . . . axiomatic that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with discharge are remedial and should be construed liberally in favor of debtors and
against creditors who challenge the scope and extent of the protection granted by the general bankruptcy discharge.");
5. This article also refers to this "honest debtor" as an "innocent debtor."
6. See, e.g., JAcKsOm, supra note 1, at 225 (noting that "the principal advantage
bankruptcy offers a debtor that is an individual lies in the benefits associated with discharge").
7. Gordon Bernant et al., A Day in the Life: The Federal Judicial Center's 19881989 Bankruptcy Court Time Study, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 491, 497-513 (1991). The figures in this study do not include the additional time spent on general challenges to discharge based on § 727 or indirect opposition to discharge pursuant to §§ such as 727,
1129 or 1325.
8. See, e.g., JAcxsoN, supra note 1, at 225 (stating that individual debtors obtain
discharge unless they violate "some norm of behavior specified in the bankruptcy
laws .... ").
9. A variety of moral values are reflected in 11 U.S.C. § 523. Section 523(a)(2),
which excludes from discharge debts "obtained by-false pretences, a false representation,
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little legislative explanation of these exceptions. Unsurprisingly, the
result is considerable confusion, controversy and litigation.1
This article deals with the dischargeability of an honest individual" debtor's liability when the debtor's agent, but not the

or actual fraud," provides the underlying basis for many of the cases dealing with the
dischargeability of vicarious debt for another's wrongdoing. These cases repeatedly emphasize the legislative objective of distinguishing between honest and dishonest debtors.
See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979) (noting that the opportunity for
protection in bankruptcy court is limited to "honest but unfortunate debtor[s]") (quoting
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709
(1877) (stating that the bankruptcy act is intended to help "the honest citizen"); Jennen v.
Hunter (In re Hunter), 771 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Congress established a
fraud exception to discharge 'to discourage fraudlent conduct and to ensure that relief
intended for honest debtors does not inure to the benefit of the dishonest.'") (quoting
Castner Knott Co. v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 12 B.R. 363, 370 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1981)); Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985)
(noting that "[b]y creating the fraud exceptions to discharge, Congress sought to discourage fraudulent conduct . . ."); Sweet v. Hanson (In re Hanson), 104 B.R. 261, 262
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1989) (arguing that "bankruptcy is not supposed to be a haven for the
dishonest debtor . . ."); Pacific Bancorporation v. Sears (In re Sears), 102 B.R. 781, 785
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that legislative history indicates that the fraud exception
was only intended to benefit honest debtors); FDIC v. Smigel (In re Smigel), 90 B.R.
935, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) ("'T]he purpose of excluding from discharge debts
obtained by fraud is to protect lenders from dishonest debtors.'") (quoting In re Bogstad,
779 F.2d 370, 373 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985)).
10. See, e.g., Luther Zeigler, Note, The Fraud Exception to Discharge in Bankruptcy:
A Reappraisal, 38 STAN. L. REV. 891, 904 n.57 (1986) (asserting that the fraud exception, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), and its statutory precursor, Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541,
§ 17a(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550, have been the most 'frequently litigated exceptions to discharge).
11. Interestingly, no special rule limits the discharge of wrongfully incurred debt of
non-individual debtors. If a non-individual debtor liquidates, whether in Chapter 7 or
11 U.S.C.
Chapter 11, it receives no discharge, even of innocently incurred debt.
§§ 727(a)(1), 1141(d)(2). However, if a non-individual debtor successfully reorganizes in
Chapter 11, it receives a discharge of all debts, even those wrongfully acquired. See,
e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985)
(allowing discharge because corporate debtor is not "individual" to whom 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 exceptions to discharge apply); Krueger v. Push & Pull Enter., Inc. (In re Push &
Pull Enter., Inc.), 84 B.R. 546, 551 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (holding § 105 does not
allow court to defeat Congressional intent that reorganizing Chapter 11 corporate debtors
receive broad discharge); Middel v. Jake's on the Pike (In re Jake's on the Pike), 78
'B.IL 461, 462 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987) (holding § 523(a)(5) exceptions to discharge do
not apply to partnerships or other non-individual debtors); Savoy Records, Inc. v.
Trafalgar Assoc. (In re Trafalgar Associates) 53 B.R. 693, 696 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(stating that whether or not a limited partnership obtains discharge depends only on the
type of its plan and whether it is confined). The disparate treatment of individual and
non-individual debt has been sustained against constitutional challenge alleging violation of
equal protection. Beard v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir. 1987) (granting more comprehensive discharge to reorganizing corporation than to individual debtor is
rationally justified).
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debtor, acts wrongfully." Denial of a discharge in such circumstances is of enormous practical significance. Countless commercial
transactions depend on the use of agents. The courts are in hopeless disarray over the discharge of these debts.
3 denied
An early Supreme Court case, Strang v. Bradner,"
discharge of an inocent debtor's liability for the intentional
wrongdoing of his agent.14 However, this decision failed to reconcile the denial of discharge with the general rule that an honest

The reason for different discharge rules regarding non-individual debtors cannot be
fully explored at this time. Briefly stated, however, the purpose of discharging a reorganizing non-individual's debt is different from that of discharging an individual's debt. For
instance, the specific humanitarian and economic justifications for providing individual
debtors with a "fresh start" are generally inapplicable in the context of non-individual
debtors. Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTmP. PROBS.,
Spring 1987, at 173, 182 ("Mhe idea that a 'fresh start' for the corporation is a good in
itself is nonsense."). The primary purpose of discharging the debt of non-individual debtors who reorganize is to ensure that the debtor will reorganize, rather than liquidate, when
such reorganization is economically efficient. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at pp. 190-192;
Baird, supra at 183-86 (observing that rehabilitation of corporate debtors through bankruptcy balances community economic concerns against individual creditors' self-interest).
After all, the non-individual debtor, as an entity, could effectively discharge its debt outside of bankruptcy by dissolving and liquidating its assets. The choice whether or not to
reorganize is perceived as an economic decision to be made on the basis of the altemative uses of the debtor's assets. If a reorganizing debtor were required to pay debts
which could be avoided in liquidation, the benefits of reorganization to the debtor would
be artificially reduced, and the debtor might make the inefficient decision to liquidate
instead.
12. Common law and statutes impose analogous vicarious liability in the context of
certain social relationships and institutions as well. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 577-3
(1985) (imposing joint and several liability on parents for the tortious acts of their children); Shook v. Beels, 217 P.2d 56, 60-61 (Cal. 1950) (holding all members of a fishing
party liable for the destruction of a plane rented by the group through one of its members because the group had engaged in joint venture); Matthews v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Ins. Co., 550 So. 2d 936, 939 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding the aunt of an
injured minor vicariously liable for the torts of her minor son who was found liable for
inflicting the injuries); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1230 (NJ. 1984) (imposing liability on a social host who served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest later found to
have caused injury while driving intoxicated); Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v, Caffiero, 431
A.2d 799, 801 (NJ.) (asserting that parents or guardians of a public school pupil may be
held vicariously liable for the pupil's vandalism of public school property), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
For a discussion of adverse consequences of preventing an honest debtor from obtaining a discharge of vicarious liability for an agent's intentional wrong, see infra text
accompanying notes 108-114 (Part 11(C)).
13. 114 U.S. 555 (1885).
14. For a discussion of the facts of Strang, see infra text accompanying notes 35-46
(Part I(B)). To facilitate discussion, the terms "agent," "partner," and "joint venturer," all
of which raise vicarious liability issues, are used interchangeably throughout this article
except where specifically indicated.
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debtor is entitled to a fresh financial start.'5 The Strang rule, reaffirmed by a number of recent cases, seems to be the majority
view, especially in cases not involving a spousal relationship between debtor and agent.16
On the other hand, a growing number of lower courts have
sidestepped Strang. This phenomenon is remarkable in several
ways. First, many of these decisions totally ignore Strang and
simply assume that an honest debtor is not to be burdened by vicariously incurred debt.17 The basis for this assumption is a preStrang Supreme Court decision, Neal v. Clark.'8 Ironically, Strang

15. The nonbankruptcy vicarious liability rule typically imposes at least compensatory
liability on an individual for her partner's wrongful actions. UNIF. PARTNERS!UP Acr
§ 13, 6 U.L.A. 1, 163 (1974) (partnership is liable for wrongful acts or omissions of a
partner acting within the ordinary course of business or with the authority of the partners). For an explanation of the policy bases for the nonbankruptcy vicarious liability rule,
and how they differ from those underlying the bankruptcy nondischargeability rule, see infra text accompanying notes 57-81 (Part 11(A)).
16. See, e.g., FDIC v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 131 B.R. 757, 763 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1991) (imputing fraud to innocent partner for dischargeability purposes, but allowing discharge because creditor failed to plead reasonable reliance); BancBoston Mortgage Corp. v.
Ledford (In re Ledford), 127 B.R. 175, 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (finding that, with five
exceptions, "the authorities are in agreement that the fraud of one partner may be imputed
to another for determining dischargeability").
17. See, e.g., Walker v. Citizens State Bank (In re Walker), 726 F.2d 452, 454 (8th
Cir. 1984) ("When the principal is recklessly indifferent to his agent's acts, it can be inferred that the principal should have known of the fraud."), on remand, 53 B.R. 174
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985); American Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Weber (In re Weber), 99
B.R. 1001, 1012-13, 1015 (Bankr. D. Utah 1989) (refusing to deny discharge to debtor
wife without evidence of her acting wrongfully, even though her husband's fraudulent acts
within the scope of their mutual business were sufficient to deny his discharge); Sostarich
v. Luton (In re Sostarich), 73 B.R 731, 735 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (holding debt dischargeable
in the absence of "actual fraud" on the part of the debtor); Cory v. Futscher (In re
Futscher), 58 B.R. 14, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (holding standard for finding vicarious
liability to be reckless disregard for the fraudulent character of one's agent's acts); Cash
v. Armstrong (In re Armstrong), 54 B.R. 399, 404, 409 (Bankr. NJ). Ala. 1985) (holding
evidence of intentional conduct in record before it sufficient to deny discharge to debtor
husband under § 523(a)(2)(A) and giving collateral estoppel effect to previous state court
judgment finding wife committed fraud to justify denial of discharge with respect to her
as well); Alden State Bank v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 29 B.R. 184, 191 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1983) (holding an innocent partner entitled to discharge where the fraudulent
partner's "intent to deceive" cannot be imputed to him); Emore v. Davis (In re Davis),
23 B.R. 633, 634 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (holding dischargeability under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) to be determined under a "'malicious, wanton, and oppressivel'" conduct
standard (footnote omitted)); In re Rutkowski, 2 B.1. 677, 679 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding a debtor entitled to discharge in the absence of "willful and malicious" participation in a partner's fraudulent conduct).
18. 95 U.S. 704 (1877). For a discussion of Neal, see infra text accompanying notes
27-34 (Part I(A)).
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acknowledged the vitality of Neal v. Clark, yet still denied discharge of vicarious debt.19 Second, the courts which have criticized Strang have failed to cite decisive sociological or ideological
developments which would justify Strang's reversal.2'
Not only is Strang based on an outdated, simplistic conceptualization of partnership and agency relationships, but it contradicts
bankruptcy's intrinsic bias in favor of allowing a "fresh start."2 1
19. Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1885).
20. Some of the courts which continue to apply the Supreme Court rule do so apologetically when unable to distinguish the precedent. See, e.g., Fluehr v. Paolino (In re
Paolino), 75 B.R. 641, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) ("Were I writing on a clean slate, I
might agree that the standards enunciated in [later cases] are sensible and should be applied.. . . However, those decisions do not articulate a persuasive basis for disregarding
binding . . . precedent.").
The Ninth Circuit had applied a rule similar to that of Strang in cases involving 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). See lInpulsora Del Territorio Sur v. Cecchini (In re Cecchini), 780
F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (-When a wrongful act such as conversion, done intentionally, necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse, it is 'willful and
malicious' even absent proof of a specific intent to injure."); Industrie Aeronautiche E.
Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio, S.p.A. v. Kasler (In re Kasler), 611 F.2d 308, 310 & n.3
(9th Cir. 1979) (construing McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916), as requiring
employee conduct to be wilful and malicious in order to impute liability, and then holding the instant debt dischargeable because an arbitration judgment finding the debtor guilty
of libel and trade disparagement did not necessarily imply wilful conduct). For further
discussion of Mclntyre and its influence on § 523(a)(6) dischargeability litigation, see
infra notes 124-44 and accompanying text (Part HI(F)(1)). However, the Ninth Circuit has
subsequently questioned the continued vitality of that approach. See LaTrattoria, Inc. v.
Lansford (In re Lansford), 822 F.2d 902, 904-05 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply strict
agency principles in light of the bankruptcy code's "fresh start" approach and questioning
"the breadth of the proposition stated in Cecchini . . . ."). The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel and bankruptcy courts for the Ninth Circuit districts have similarly questioned Cecchini. See California State Bank v. Lauricella (In re Lauricella), 105 B.R. 536,
539 n.3 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) ("Cecchini's standard for imputing liability under agency
principles may be overly broad in light of the Code's fresh start purposes ... ."); Travelers Express Co. v. Washington (In re Washington), 105 B.R. 947, 953 n. 13 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1989) (following Cecchini as binding precedent, but protesting its flawed statutory construction). But see FDIC v. Figge (In re Figge), 94 B.R. 654, 669-70 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1988) (applying Lansford despite questions raised in subsequent Ninth Circuit
decisions), af'd, 928 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991); Laborers Clean-up Contract Admin. Trust
Fund v. Kay (In re Kay), 60 B.R. 174, 176-77 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (citing Strang
and Cecchini and concluding that, although analysis in Cecchini was "regrettably brief,"
the court was "bound by that decision" in determining whether to impute liability to the
debtor).
For a discussion of the changes in vicarious liability doctrine and the reasons they
are insufficient to warrant a judicial rejection of the Strang rule, see infra text accompanying notes 179-91 (Part V(A)(2)).
21. See, e.g., Alden State Bank v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 29 B.R. 184, 191
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) ("The clear legislative policy of discharging the honest debtor

would be negated by imputing the deceptive intent of one partner to an honest, innocent
debtor partner."). For a discussion of Strang's partnership model, see infra text accompa-
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In addition, it is fundamentally unfair and is inconsistent with
bankruptcy law's treatment of other forms of vicariously acquired
debt.' Moreover, as lower courts struggle to avoid application of
Strang, some adopt questionable alternative rationales which in turn
become poor case law.' Consequently, the Strang doctrine may
result in damage outside its own narrow analytical framework
while serving no useful purpose in that framework or otherwise.
The pernicious effects of Strang are especially evident when
the rule is applied in social contexts, such as between spouses,
rather than in commercial ones. Social "partners" are less able to
dissolve 24
their "partnerships" or protect themselves against wrongful
"agents." Because the Strang doctrine is unlikely to affect such
debtors' conduct with respect to the relationship, it merely punishes
these debtors for wrongs they did not commit. Thus, application of
Strang condemns these innocent debtors to permanent, or at least
indefinite, pauperism. Furthermore, to the extent that financial
transactions within a marriage are predominantly controlled by one
gender rather than shared, Strang exacerbates gender discrimination.'
This article explores the basis for and status of the controversy
regarding the dischargeability of an honest debtor's liability for
another's fraud and proposes that the Strang rule be eliminated.
The article concludes that, although there is some basis for judicial
repudiation of Strang, the likelihood of such reversal is slim.
Consequently, the article proposes specific legislation to overrule
Strang.
Part I reviews the origins of the Strang doctrine. Part II contrasts the policies underlying the vicarious liability rule of agency
law to those of the basic rule regarding the nondischargeability of
nying notes 88-90 (Part MI(A)), and for analysis of its impact on the fresh start doctrine,
see infra text accompanying notes 108-11 (Part I11(C).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14, 122-48 (Parts HI(D), II(F)).
23. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 153, 157-58 (dealing with distinctions between
negligence and recklessness standards for debtors' conduct and with agents' actions outside
the scope of their authority).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 115-21 (Part MI(E)).
25. See Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability
for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1990) (arguing that the
current rule of joint return liability for spouses is unfair to the innocent spouse forced to
pay the other's taxes); see generally Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System:
New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1506 (1990) (discussing whether
attributes of bankruptcy outside the scope of this article disparately and adversely affect
women).
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wrongfully incurred debt. Part III criticizes Strang's analytical
foundation and its impact on individual debtors and on bankruptcy
law generally. The current status of Strang is examined in Part IV,
and Part V proposes alternative judicial and legislative methods for
overruling the Strang doctrine.
I.

ORIGIN OF THE STRANG DocTiNE

In Neal v. Clark, the Supreme Court eloquently enunciated the
goal of bankruptcy law: to provide a financial fresh start for honest
debtors.2 6 Neal provides the basic foundation for the analysis undertaken in subsequent sections of this article.
A.

Neal v. Clark27

Griffith Neal bought two bonds from an estate in a transaction
with the estate's executor. The Court noted that the executor, the
brother of the deceased, was of "undoubted solvency."2 8 At the
time of the sale, the executor explained to Neal that he was selling
the bonds on behalf of the estate to reimburse himself for money
he had advanced to the estate.
Subsequently, Clark became a surety of the estate and sued
the executor, Neal, and others, alleging that the bonds had been
sold below market value and the sale thus constituted a fraudulent
waste of estate assets.29 The lower court agreed, finding Neal

guilty of constructive, but not actual, fraud. After he purchased
bonds, but before Clark filed suit, Neal was adjudicated a bankrupt
under the bankruptcy law of 1867. He therefore pleaded his bankruptcy discharge as a defense in Clark's action regarding the
bonds.
Section 33 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, a predecessor to
Bankruptcy Code subsections 523(a)(2)(A) and (B),30 provided
that "no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt ... shall be discharged ... .,,3' The Court of Appeals ruled
that the debt incurred by Neal's constructive fraud was not dis-

26. 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (finding that Congress intended the Bankruptcy Act to

provide "the honest citizen [relief] from the burden of hopeless insolvency").
27. 95 U.S. 704 (1877).
28. Id. at 704.
29. The Court characterized the action as a "devastavi: of the estate." Id at 707.

30. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A)-(B).
31. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (1867).
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32

charged.

Speaking for the Court in reversing the Virginia judgment,
Justice Harlan announced that Congress intended to enact a bankruptcy law "by which the honest citizen may be relieved from the
burden of hopeless insolvency."3 3 For a debt to be
nondischargeable because it was created by "fraud," the fraud had
to be "positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or
intentional wrong ...
and not implied fraud, or fraud in law,
which may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality."' In thus upholding the discharge, the Supreme Court seemed
to set a clear policy that the honest debtor would be entitled to a
discharge, despite the "fraud" exception established by section 33.
B.

Strang v. Bradner3s

Less than eight years after Neal, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to interpret section 33 of the Bankruptcy Act of
1867. Strang v. Bradner was a suit against a partnership, Strang &
Holland Bros., and its individual partners.3 6 Strang, acting for the
partnership, had defrauded Lowrey & Bradner into executing and
delivering to him certain promissory notes which were then discounted to bona fide purchasers.3 7 The Court observed that individual defendants John B. Holland and Joseph Holland were not
involved in the fraudulent misrepresentations.3 ' Furthermore, the
misrepresentations were made neither at their behest nor even with
their knowledge.3 9 The Hollands were honest debtors who were
liable for the fraudulent act only by virtue of their relation to
Strang. Partners are liable for partnership debts and are vicariously
liable for acts committed by other partners in the conduct of partnership business. 4°
The Court held that Strang, who had actually made the misrepresentations, was guilty of "positive fraud" under the Neal

32. Jones' Ex'rs v. Clark, 66 Va. 642, 664-66 (1875), rev'd sub nom Neal v. Clark,

95 U.S. 704 (1877).
33. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. (emphasis added).
114 U.S. 555 (1885).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
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test.4" The Court further held, in an opinion delivered by the
same Justice Harlan who authored the Neal decision, that this fraud
was "to be imputed... to all the members of his firm." 42 It reasoned that each partner was the agent of the partnership and that
when, in the conduct of the partnership, one partner makes false or
fraudulent misrepresentations to innocent persons, the other partners
"cannot escape pecuniary responsibility therefor upon the ground
that such misrepresentations were made without their knowledge."4 3 Justice Harlan added that this conclusion was especially
valid "when ... the partners, who were not themselves guilty of
wrong, received and appropriated the fruits of the fraudulent conduct of their associate in business." 44
The Court did not explain why the honest partner was guilty
of anything more than "implied fraud or fraud in law," which was
dischargeable under Neal.45 The Court found the Hollands liable
without finding they had been negligent in supervising Strang.46
The Court also failed to articulate how its decision in Strang was
consistent with the Congressional intent to benefit the honest citizen. In contrast, the Court's exposition of partnership law was
flawless. Had the honest partners not obtained a bankruptcy discharge, their liability under nonbankruptcy law for their partner's
wrongful conduct would have been unquestionable. Unfortunately,
the Court failed to explain why the imputed fraud in Strang warranted treatment different from the constructive or implied fraud
addressed by Neal.
That the innocent partners in Strang benefited from the fraud
cannot sufficiently explain such disparate treatment.4 7 First, the

41. Id. at 559.
42. Id. at 561.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. See Id. at 559. Harmonizing Strang with Neal is arguably even more difficult in
light of the Sixth Circuit's relatively recent interpretation of Neal:
In its use of the language 'moral turpitude' and 'intentional wrong,' the Court
rm Neal] was indicating that all of the underlying elements necessary for the
nondischargeability of a debt created by fraud must be effected by the personal
action of the bankrupt and may not be imputed to him by the acts of another.
Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 1982).
46. Strang, 114 U.S. at 561.
47. Most post-Strang decisions have not required a showing that the innocent debtor

benefits from the fraud:
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Court indicated that the receipt of a benefit was merely an exacerbating factor, not a necessary one.48 Second, even in cases of
"implied fraud" covered by Neal, the debtor benefits at the
creditor's expense. 9 Whether an innocent debtor benefitted from
her agent's conduct may be a reasonable basis for imposing vicarious liability on the debtor.' It simply is not, by itself, a good
reason for excepting such liability from discharge.5 1 In fact, al-

Although the Supreme Court in Strang noted that the innocent partners "received and appropriated the fruits of the fraudulent conduct of their associate in
business," 114 U.S. at 561, the courts have generally not required a showing of
ratification or acceptance of the benefits of a partner's wrongdoing in denying
dischargeability from partnership debts.
Frank R. Kennedy, The Discharge of Partnerships and Partners Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 38 VAND. L. REV. 857, 895 n.131. Nonetheless, some courts have stressed this
factor. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Mann (In re Mann), 40 B.R. 496, 499
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (stating that financial benefit to debtor, who was president, director and shareholder of corporation for which he obtained money, was enough to make
§ 523(a)(2) applicable); Shelton v. Wells (In re Shelton), 28 B.RL 218, 222 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1983) (holding that where a wife profited from her husband's fraud she was liable
for damages); In re Maloof, 2 F.2d 373, 374 (N.D. Ga. 1924) (wife benefited from
husband's fraud). But see Chicago Title Ins. Co., Inc. v. Mart (In re Mart), 75 B.R. 808,
810 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (refusing to impute husband's to his wife merely because she
received some benefit from the fraud); First Security Bank v. Steinman (In re Steinman),
61 B.R. 368, 374 n.11 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (noting that receipt of benefits is relevant
only if the "innocent" party knowingly accepted the benefits of the malefactor's wrongdoing); Wilson v. Bursh (In re Bursh), 14 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981) ("assertion
that the marital community benefited from defendant's husband's acts and therefore that
the defendant should be barred from discharging the resulting debts amounts to fraud
implied by law . . . ").

48. Strang, 114 U.S. at 561.
And if, in the conduct of partnership business . . . one partner makes false or
fraudulent misrepresentations of fact to the injury of innocent persons who deal
with him as representing the firm . . . his partners cannot escape pecuniary
responsibility ....
This is especially so when, as in the case before us, the
partners, who were not themselves guilty of wrong, received and appropriated
the fruits of the fraudulent conduct of their associate in business.
Id. (emphasis added).
49. For instance, the debtor in Neal benefited from the fact that the bonds had been
sold to him at a discount. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 707 (1877).
50. Of course, one could argue that such benefit should be insufficient to impose full
vicarious liability. Perhaps the innocent debtor should merely be forced to disgorge the
actual benefit enjoyed by her.
51. Acceptance of benefit with actual knowledge of the wrongdoing, however, may
constitute morally reprehensible ratification of the wrong. Cf Openshaw v. Oregon Auto.
Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 929, 932 (Idaho 1971) (holding insurer not liable for punitive damages
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though debtor benefit is a natural concomitant of the creation of
most debt, such benefit does not ordinarily prevent discharge of the
debt.
Strang is rarely cited for the nondischargeability of vicariously
incurred debt. 2 Many subsequent lower courts, apparently oblivious of Strang, have ruled in ways at least facially inconsistent with
it.53 Despite this considerable split in authority, there seems to
have been virtually no discussion of Strang in academic or trade
literature. Even some of the courts which cite and apply Strang do
so grudgingly, acknowledging that they do not understand or agree
with its reasoning.' Neal, in contrast, is consistently cited as authority that debt dishonestly incurred is dischargeable so long as
the debtor did not participate in the dishonest actions. 55
unless insurer's manager ratified subordinate's wrongdoing); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 217C (1958) (punitive damages may be imposed on principal who ratified
agent's wrongdoing); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1982) (same). In such a
situation, a court might deny a discharge irrespective of Strang. See First Security Bank
v. Steinman (In re Steinman), 61 B.R. 368, 374 n.11 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (stating
that receipt of benefits justifies exception from discharge only if debtor knowingly accepted the benefits). However, even this question is more complicated than it seems at first.
Section 523(a)(2)(A), for instance, excepts debts incurred by fraud.
11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A). If under applicable nonbankruptcy law the passive partner is vicariously
liable for compensatory damages before ratification, it is arguable that the debt for compensatory damages was not "incurred" by the subsequent wrongful ratification. Indeed,
even if the debt could be characterized as arising from subsequent ratification, ratification
is not necessarily the same thing as fraud.
On the other hand, in support of
nondischargeability, one might argue, for instance, that the ratification constituted fraudulent non-disclosure of the original fraud.
52. Strang has actually been cited for the rule that only those frauds which involve
moral turpitude produce nondischargeable debts. See, e.g., Wright v. Lubinko, 515 F.2d
260, 264 (9th Cir. 1975); First Nat. Bank v. Bruce (In re Bruce), 18 B.R. 135, 137
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1982).
53. See cases cited infra notes 156-57, 160, 162, 164-66, 168.
54. See supra note 20.
55. See, e.g., Schweig v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 780 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir. 1986)
("debtor must be guilty of positive fraud . . . and not implied fraud . . . which may

exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality" (citations omitted)); Public Fin.
Corp. of Redlends v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 514 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1975) (concluding that a party alleging fraud must prove "actual or positive fraud, not merely fraud
implied by law"); Farina v. Balzano (In re Balzano), 127 B.R. 524, 530 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1991)(discharging debt where creditor failed to prove that actual fraud or misrepresentations of the debtor led her to believe they would be married); Ellis v. Shear (In re
Shear), 123 B.R. 247, 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991)(refusing to give preclusive effect to a
state court judgment for determining fraud because jury in state court did not have to
find actual fraud to reach its verdict); Leeb v. Guy (In re Guy), 101 B.R. 961, 976
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (interpreting the legislative history of § 523(a)(2)(A) which cites
Neal); Shafer v. Wintrow (In re Wintrow), 57 B.R. 695, 706 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986)
("Mhefraud which is not dischargeable by a bankrupt is 'positive fraud... involving
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VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND NONDISCHARGEABILITY: A COMPARATIVE POuCY ANALYSIS

The Strang Court cited the vicarious liability rule of agency
and partnership law as its basis for refusing to discharge the
Hollands' vicarious debt.5 6 However, the Court offered no explanation of the relationship, if any, between the policies underlying
the traditional vicarious liability rule and bankruptcy's exceptions
to discharge. Examination of the policy bases of the vicarious
liability rule and the rationale supporting its application in the
bankruptcy context accentuates the problems with Strang. None of
the principal rationales for the vicarious liability rule requires that
vicarious liability be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Furthermore,
although direct scrutiny of the nondischargeability rule reveals a
tenuous possible justification for Strang, that saving argument was
not explicitly addressed by the Court.
A.

Vicarious Liability Rule

Partnership law prescribes that partners are mutually liable for
partnership debts incurred by any of them in the ordinary course of
the partnership business.57 This is true whether the acting partner
incurred debt reasonably, negligently, or by intentional fraud.58 A
simplistic conceptualization of this rule would be that, together, the
various partners form a single entity with multiple hands.
According to this analysis of partners' liability, where one
partner is guilty of misconduct, the entity, and the other partners
who are a part of the entity, are similarly culpable.59 It would

moral turpitude or intentional wrong .... "') (quoting Ames v. Moir, 138 U.S. 306, 311
(1891) (quoting Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877))); Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v.
Pornmerer (In re Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 939 (Banlr. D. Minn. 1981) ("Actual fraud involves moral turpitude and does not include fraud implied in law .... "). The same
standard is also repeated in cases which do not cite Neal by name. See, e.g., Smith v.
Meyers (In re Schwartz & Meyers), 130 B.R. 416, 422 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("To be
actionable, the debtor's conduct must involve moral turpitude or intentional wrong; mere
negligence, poor business judgment or fraud implied in law ... is insufficient.").
56. Strang, 114 U.S. at 561 ("[W]e are of opinion that his fraud is to be imputed, for
the purposes of the action, to all the members of his firm ....
Each partner was the
agent and representative of the firm with reference to all business within the scope of the
partnership.").
57. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914).
58. Id. § 13.

59. Id. §§ 11-14.
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thus appear from the rule holding a passive partner vicariously
liable for the intentional wrongdoing of an active partner that the
passive partner is not "innocent," but somehow morally blameworthy. Yet this simplistic conceptualization of the vicarious liability
rule is inaccurate both from a policy perspective and, in many
instances, as the rule is applied.
1. Policies
This article cannot review the entire subject of vicarious liability. Examination of its major themes, however, reveals that they do
not persuasively explain why such debt should not be dischargeable
in bankruptcy. Modem commentators offer primarily four policy
explanations for the vicarious liability rule.6° None justifies the
Strang doctrine.
The traditional argument supporting vicarious liability is premised on the theory that a principal has control over her agent.
Thus, the principal is in a position to prevent the loss from occurring through careful selection and monitoring of agents. Therefore,
the vicarious liability rule motivates
the principal to take effective
61
measures to prevent the loss.

The other explanations address broader policy grounds.62 The

60. Other, more dubious rationales have been proffered historically. See W. PAGE
KEsTON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW Op TORTS, § 69, at 500 (5th ed.

1984); see also Thatcher v. Austin (In re Austin), 36 B.R. 306, 311 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1984) (rejecting these other explanations).
To facilitate discussion, no distinction is made at this point between vicarious liability of partners for the acts of other partners and vicarious liability of principals, generally,
for the acts of their agents. None of the cases discussing Strang have drawn such a
distinction. Instead, a number of cases have simply applied Strang to agency contexts
not involving partnerships. See, e.g., Industrie Aeronautiche E. Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio
S.p.A. v. Kasler (In re Kasler), 611 F.2d 308, 309-10 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that if
liability arose from agent's misrepresentations, principal's debt not discharged); Aldis v.
Brown (In re Brown), 412 F. Supp. 1066, 1068-70 (W.D. Okla. 1975)(holding that debt
for agent's wrongful act nondischargeable); In re Maloof, 2 F.2d 373, 374 (N.D. Ga.
1924) (holding that debtor's liability agent's fraud is nondischargeable). See also other
cases, infra note 156.
61. This view is known as the "prevention or "private policeman" theory. See Steven
N. Bulloch, Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, 27 WM &
MARY L. REV. 301, 303 (1986) (arguing that the fraud rule developed to promote efficient business transactions); Harold L Laskl, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE
LJ. 105, 114 (1916) ("If we allow the master to be careless of his servant's torts we
lose hold upon the most valuable check in the conduct of social life.").
62. Some have said that the prevention theory is no longer the leading justification for
the vicarious liability rule. See, e.g., Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 785
(Milnn. 1973) (stating that the justification most frequently given is that of loss spreading);
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second involves a theory of "loss spreading." 63 It assumes that an
agent's principal is in a better position than the agent's victim to
absorb or spread any loss among various parties.' A principal
might accomplish this through liability insurance, price increases,
or profit or wage reductions. In contrast, the agent's victim may
lack a meaningful opportunity to spread the loss, either because
appropriate insurance is unavailable, or because victims are emotionally or intellectually unable to appreciate the need for insur65
ance.
A third theory contends that the principal should pay in order
to increase economic efficiency through use of the price system.
To accommodate her potential liability, the principal is expected to
increase the cost of the product, using the extra proceeds to pay
for appropriate liability insurance or to compensate for self-insuring. The argument is that all societal costs generated by a business
should be included in the price of the product. 66 Assuming that
consumers make purchase decisions based on price, pricing goods
so that they properly reflect their societal costs will result in an
allocation of production resources which maximizes societal wel-

Bulloch supra note 61, at 305 (asserting that the modem trend among many courts and
commentators is away from "prevention" theory toward "loss spreading" and "allocation of
resources" theories).
63. See, e.g., Austin, 36 B.R. at 311 (defining vicarious liability as a social policy
promoting allocation of risk); Lange, 211 N.W.2d at 785 (explaining that an employer
"may . . . avoid the cost by insuring against such contingencies, or by adjusting his prices so that his patrons must bear part, if not all, of the burden . . ."); see generally
Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456-57 (1923) (elaborating
on the historical legal perspectives of the doctrine of respondeat superior and policy of
loss spreading); KEETON et al., supra note 60, § 69, at 500-01 (noting that principal is
better equipped to absorb and spread costs of loss).
64. Of course, this assumption may not always be correct. See generally Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.. 499,
517-27 (1961) (discussing when enterprises can and cannot spread losses).
65. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 173 (1987) ("principals

may have better knowledge than actors about the nature of risk or be able themselves to
take actions than can lower it."); see also Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious
Liability, 93 YALE LJ. 1231, 1236 (1984) ("to the extent that the risks of civil liability
are insurable, a principal often can obtain insurance more cheaply than his agents.").
66. See Calabresi, supra note 64, at 505 ("ITihe cost of injuries should be borne by
the activities which caused them, whether or not fault is involved, because, either way,
the injury is a real cost of those activities."); see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 84 (1990)
(arguing imposition of vicarious liability for punitive damages can be economically efficient where compensatory damages and substantive tort rules do not adequately measure
society's total accident costs).
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fare. 7
A fourth explanation relates specifically to an agent's apparent
authority to act for her principal.68 The argument is that transaction of business through agents is economically efficient.69 To
capture the benefits of such efficiency, people must be persuaded
to rely on one another's agents.7" This reliance is best promoted
by legal rules holding principals fully accountable for their agents'
1
7

acts.

Even assuming that these rationales may justify the basic
vicarious liability rule, they fail to explain why vicarious debt
should be nondischargeable. 2 None of the justifications assumes

67. See Calabresi, supra note 64, at 514 ("Mhe postulate that people are by and large
best off if they can choose what they want, on the basis of what it costs our economy to
produce it, would be violated if enterprises are not charged with the true costs of the
goods they produce."); R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 L LAW & ECON 1,
40 (1960) ("The main advantage of a pricing system is that it leads to the employment
of factors in places where the value of the product yielded is greatest and does so at less
cost than alternative systems. .. ").
68. Bulloch, supra note 61, at 314 (arguing that this justification is more frequently
used regarding liability for an agent's fraud than for other torts).
69. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 567
(1982) (stating that a principal's liability under an apparent authority theory is predicated
on "business expediency").
70. Bulloch, supra note 61, at 315 (arguing that an agent's apparent authority promotes
efficiency by eliminating the time-consuming and burdensome requirement of verifying the
agent's status before entering legal or commercial relations with the principal).
71. Id.
72. At least some applications of the rule have been criticized. See D&S Auto Parts,
Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964, 966 (7th Cir. 1988) (declining to extend vicarious liability in RICO context); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 136-37 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hays, L,
dissenting) (arguing that vicarious liability based on imputed knowledge derived from
statutory duties is an inappropriate means of extending responsibility to a prison warden
in civil rights case); THOMAS BATY, VICARIoUs LIABILTY 154 (1916) (criticizing vicarious liability in employer/employee context because -[i]n
hard fact, the real reason for
employers' liability is [that] damages are taken from a deep pocket"); KEEMN et al.,supra
note 60, § 72, at 522, § 73, at 525, § 123, at 913 (5th ed. 1984) (criticizing vicarious
liability imposed on the owner/lender of an automobile for the negligence of the driver
because the owner is also a passenger, imposed on the head of a household who allows a
family member to drive the family automobile for the driver's negligence and imposed on
parents for the negligence of their children); Charles A. Marvin, Discerning the Parent's
Liability for the Harm Inflicted by a Nondiscerning Child, 44 LA. L. REV. 1213 passim
(1984) (criticizing imposition, under civil law, of liability on parents for harm inflicted by
their child under the age of discernment); Claire G. Combs, Note, Hospital Vicarious
Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors and Staff Physicians: Criticisms of
Ostensible Agency Doctrine in Ohio, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 711, 713 (1987) (opposing imposition of liability on hospitals for negligence of physicians "based on the patients 'reasonable' expectations regardless of the actual legal arrangements between a hospital and a
physician"); William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client Rela-
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that the passive partner is morally culpable in the same way, or to
the same extent, as the wrongdoer. 3 Furthermore, none explains
why a debtor should receive a bankruptcy discharge when her
agent acted negligently, but not when the agent acted with moral
turpitude.
In theory imposing vicarious liability without regard for the
principal's fault provides an incentive to principals to minimize the
likelihood of agent misbehavior. This rule is designed to inhibit
both negligent and purposeful agent misconduct. Actually, "strict"
liability is even more appropriate regarding negligent conduct than
intentional agent misconduct.7 4 The loss spreading, economic efficiency, and facilitation of commercial transactions arguments seem
equally applicable to cases of agent negligence and intentional misconduct. None of these explanations, however, supports the notion
that vicarious liability of innocent principals derives from their
moral blameworthiness for their agents' actions.
2.

Application

A brief examination of punitive damages suggests that the
moral blameworthiness conceptualization of vicarious liability is as
inaccurate in practice as it is in theory. Under state law, punitive
damages are often imposed for fraudulent conduct 7 5 If the fraudu-

tionship: An Improper Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their Attorneys'
Procedural Errors, 1988 DUKE L.J. 733, 740-41 (criticizing application of agency theory
to hold clients accountable for attorneys' errors in matters where clients have no right to
control); see generally Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 21415 (1954) (approving vicarious liability, but arguing that its application to an owner-passenger for negligence of the driver of the owner's automobile cannot be justified as a
means of distributing accident losses). But see Kathy Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989) (advocating
vicarious liability in sexual hatrassment cases); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal
Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988) (arguing that current vicarious liability laws are
reasonable efficient but proposing certain modifications).
73. See, e.g., Thatcher v. Austin (In re Austin), 36 B.R. 306, 312 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1984). In Austin, the court explained that "application of vicarious liability would effectively vitiate the [11 U.S.C.] § 523(a)(6) requirement that only debts resulting from willful
acts committed by the debtor be nondischargeable. Vicarious liability as a social policy or
legal fiction ignores the master's knowledge and imposes fault and financial responsibility
without regard to culpability or intent." Id.
74. See authorities cited supra notes 63-67.
75. See, e.g., Treesh v. Stone, 197 P. 425, 426 (Cal. 1921) (stating that CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3294 allows award of exemplary damages where defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice); Augusta Bank & Trust v. Broomfield, 643 P.2d 100, 110
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lent acts of an agent are deemed to have been the acts of the
principal, then whenever punitive damages are imposed on the
agent they should be available against the principal as well. However, while the imposition of punitive damages on a party who
directly commits fruad ordinarily lies within the broad discretion of
the trier in fact,76 the imposition of punitive damages on persons
who are only vicariously liable is subject to a variety of approaches. At the time Strang was decided, a large number of jurisdictions
declined to impose punitive damages on an honest partner or principal.' Moreover, not even all jurisdictions allowing the imposition of such damages necessarily burden honest partners or principals to the same extent as guilty actors.78 Frequently, triers of fact
may consider the parties' respective moral culpability.7 9 Similarly,

(Kan. 1982) (finding that defendant-appellee's fraudulent representations justified jury's
award of punitive damages); Prince v. State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 S.E. 766, 768 (S.C.
1907) (stating that where breach of contract is accompanied by a fraudulent act, punitive
damages are recoverable); see also KEETON et al., supra note 60, § 2, at 11.
76. See, e.g., Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 771-72, 776 (9th Cir.
1984) (affirming jury's punitive damage award against principal for agent's "extreme deviation" from reasonable broker conduct where "substantial evidence" showed the conduct
supra note 60, § 2, at 11.
was in the scope of employment); see also KEETON, et al.,
77. See, &g., Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia of Danbury, 42 A. 67, 70 (Conn.
1899) (denying award of punitive damages for an assault committed by the defendant's
agent while removing plaintiff from dance floor); Craven v. Bloomingdale, 64 N.E. 169,
171 (N.Y. 1902) (holding a merchant whose agent caused the illegal arrest of customer
not liable for punitive damages). See also infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
78. Often, such punitive damages, when assessed, are quite low relative to the compensatory award or the principal's assets. See, e.g., Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v.
North Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding a damage award of $9,577,760.00 including $500,000.00 in punitive damages against a grain
terminal owner because the owner's foreman, acting "within the 'scope of his employ-

ment,'" was grossly negligent); Hafrock, 750 F.2d at 773 (holding a brokerage firm liable
for punitive damages based on the conduct of two of its brokers and noting that the

award was not excessive since the punitive damages equaled only one-third of one percent
of the firm's gross revenues). But see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,
384-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding a corporation liable for $3,500,000.00 in punitive

damages because management continued production of defective automobiles with knowledge of test results indicating fuel tank danger).
79. There are four circumstances under which punitive damages are awarded against a
principal because of the acts of an agent:
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of
the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in
employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
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honest partners may be treated differently as to criminal liability.'
All of these rules, to the extent they permit such disparate treatment, suggest that the Strang doctrine, based on its simplistic conceptualization of partnership or agency principles is on infirm
ground.81
B.

Policies Underlying the Nondischargeability Rule

The basic policies underlying the intentional wrongdoing exceptions to discharge do not explain the Strang results. Although
courts have often stated- that Congress, in providing a discharge,
did not intend to benefit dishonest debtors, this conclusory assertion is unaccompanied by detailed explanation.82
Some authorities suggest that discharge is denied to dishonest

(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the
act.
RESTAmMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979). These four circumstances are also listed
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958).
The Supreme Court recently decided that imposing punitive damages on a party who
is only vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior does not violate due
process. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, II1 S. Ct. 1032, 1041 (1991). See also
infra notes 180-190 and accompanying text.
80. See generally, ALAN R. BROMBERO & LARRY E. RPBsTEIN, 1 BROMBERG AND
RBsn'n ON PARTNERSHIP, § 4.07(e), at 4:89-90 (1988).
81. The differences between the conceptualization of partnership and agency liability of
the various states and the conceptualization upon which Strang is predicated raises an
important, broad question as to the proper integration of state law and federal bankruptcy
law. However, this issue lies beyond the scope of this article
82. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991) (limiting application of
"fresh start" policy to honest debtors); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)
(finding purpose of Banlkruptcy Act is to give honest but unfortunate debtor new opportunity); Thul v. Ophaug (In re Ophaug), 827 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that
once a debtor is proven dishonest, there is no entitlement to a "fresh start"); see also
cases cited supra note 9.
Commentators have made similar conclusory assertions. See, e.g., Charles G.
Hallinan, Consumer Bankruptcy, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 90-95 (1986) (asserting that the
effect of 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code was to narrow the discharge availability found in the broad fresh start concept codified in 1975 version); Margaret Howard, A
Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 10Io ST. L.J 1047, 1051 (1987) (analyzing the 1984 amendments which bar discharge of debts incurred by false pretences or
actual fraud as recognizing the general goal of bankruptcy to reward only the honest
debtor); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1393, 1441 (1985) (viewing the Bankruptcy Code's denial of discharge for fraud
and similar misconduct against creditors as an effort to deter these activities); William T.
Plumb, Jr., The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws - Exempt
and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1975) (concluding that the bankruptcy laws
were designed "to keep body and soul together and facilitate debtor's 'fresh start'").
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debtors to punish them.83 Presumably the purpose of this penalty
is deterrence; a particular debtor will be deterred from repeating
her fraud and other prospective debtors will be deterred from committing fraud altogether.84 In addition, some might argue that punishment also morally improves the debtor.8'
Others contend that debts fraudulently incurred are
nondischargeable to prevent particular creditors from being victimized.8 6 However, no such special concern is shown for a creditor
whose borrower has simply become insolvent. Although the creditor is assumed to have knowingly accepted all ordinary business
risks, a debtor's intentional wrong somehow falls outside the pale
of a creditor's legitimate expectations. All other things being equal,
creditors so wronged are purportedly entitled to our sympathy and
protection, and the wrongdoing debtors are undeserving, as to such
debts, of the benefit of a bankruptcy discharge. Thus, the
nondischargeability rule is based primarily on the debtor's being
guilty of morally offensive conduct.
II.

CRITICISM OF STRANG

This section examines seven basic criticisms of the Strang
doctrine." The first is analytical while the others are more prag-

83. See, e.g., Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir.
1985) ("[O]ne of the purposes of the fraud exceptions to discharge is to punish the debtor
for engaging in fraudulent conduct."); Philip Shuchman, The FraudException in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 23 STAN. L. REV. 735, 739 (1971) (arguing that "denial of the privilege of
discharge for a fraudulently procured debt may be best understood from the bankrupt's
point of view as a form of civil punishment for his fraud").
84. See, e.g., Jennen v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 771 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that "Congress established a fraud exception to discharge 'to discourage
fraudulent conduct . .. ') (quoting Castner Knott Co. v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 12 B.R.
363, 370 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981)); Case, 755 F.2d at 1477 (finding that "[b]y creating
the fraud exceptions to discharge, Congress sought to discourage fraudulent conduct ...
"); Capital City Bank & Trust v. Kroh (In re Kroh), 88 B.R. 987, 992 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1988) ("Congress established the fraud exception to discharge to discourage fraudulent
conduct . . . ." (citations omitted)).
85. See generally Robert . Lipkin, The Moral Good Theory of Punishment, 40 U.
FLA. L. REV. 17, 19 (1988) (asserting that the aim of punishment under the Moral Good
theory is to restore the offender's moral identity).
86. See, e.g., FDIC v. Smigel (In re Smigel), 90 B.R. 935, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988) (stating that "the purpose of excluding from discharge debts obtained by fraud is to
protect lenders from dishonest debtors" (quoting In re Bogstad, 779 F.2d 370, 373 n.4
(7th Cir. 1985))).
87. MfIscellaneous additional disadvantages could be identified. For example, as discussed Infra text accompanying notes 156-60 (Part IV(A)), the Strang doctrine may result
in dangerously misleading precedent.
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matic. All are to some extent interdependent.
A.

Presupposes a Primitive Partnership Model

Nonbankruptcy law treats partnerships flexibly, sometimes as
aggregates of individuals and sometimes as monoliths. The treatment of a partnership in any particular context depends on the
policy underlying the applicable laws. Strang is analytically flawed
because it is based on a primitive model of partnerships as multihanded monoliths. This model does not speak to the policy objectives of bankruptcy's exceptions to discharge.8" Indeed, this model
is not even the exclusive paradigm for determining the legal treatment of partners, partnerships, and standards of vicarious liability
outside the realm of bankruptcy. Thus courts deciding whether to
impose punitive damages need not treat individual partners identically.8 9 Instead, each partner is subject to individual assessment of
culpability. 90
The denial of discharge in bankruptcy is punitive, both in
purpose and effect, and is based on the debtor's moral culpability
for fraudulent conduct. Consequently, a judicial rule denying discharge should examine the moral culpability of individual debtors.
B.

Irrelevant to Dischargeability Goals

Courts are generally in agreement regarding the goals of policies underlying denial of discharge in bankruptcy. 91 The second
criticism of Strang is that it fails to promote any of those purposes.
1. Harms Honest Debtors
The Strang doctrine cannot be justified by reference to Congressional intent to withhold the benefit of a discharge from dishonest debtors. The essence of Strang is the denial of certain discharge benefits to honest debtors who were uninvolved in and

88. See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text (Part M1(B)).
89. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (Part H(A)(2)).
90. Similarly, an innocent partner is not usually vicariously liable under criminal law
for the acts of another partner. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.10(d) (2d ed. 1986) ("Generally, it may be said that the fact that the defendant is a partner in a business enterprise has no bearing on the question of whether he
is accountable for the criminal conduct of others [unless] he has authorized or participated
in them."); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 80, § 4.07(e), at 4:89-90.
91. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (Part II(B)).
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unaware of their partners' misbehavior. These honest debtors committed no act warranting retribution and require no moral catharsis.
2.

Provides No Meaningful Deterrent

Deterrence is a similarly unpersuasive explanation for Strang.
The debtor is guilty, at most, of negligence in not selecting or
maintaining more honorable partners. Debts negligently incurred in
other contexts are ordinarily dischargeable. Such debts are not
excepted from discharge to encourage prospective debtors to be
more circumspect. Effective deterrence of negligent conduct by
potential debtors would require a rule applicable to a broader class
of persons than the Strang doctrine affects.
Even if Congress were more interested in deterring morally
offensive wrongdoing than in discouraging negligence, benkruptcy
law provides an ineffective vehicle for accomplishing that goal. A
nondischargeability rule can only marginally increase an honest
person's motivation to prevent her partner's wrongdoing. Existing
nonbankruptcy civil sanctions, including possible punitive damages,' already serve as a powerful incentive for such oversight.
Furthermore, any potential gain in incentive for exercising control
over one's agents must be discounted by the fact that insolvency is
not generally a planned condition, and, therefore, principals are unlikely to consider the Bankruptcy Code's sanctions in developing
their agency relationships. 93 Consequently, even if a prospective
debtor properly appreciated these factors, the Strang rule would
have little deterrent effect.
Furthermore, it has been argued that there are psychological
limits on the ability of prospective debtors to fully appreciate these
probabilities.' Instead, people tend to process information in ways
which underestimate future risks.95

92. See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
93. As long as the partnership is solvent, nondischargeability of a fraudulently incurred
debt would be a completely empty threat to the culpable partner. Even if the debt were
collected from that partner, she could collect all or substantially all of the sum from the
partnership or from the other partners. Consequently, the rule could only effectively deter
one who anticipated that both the partnership and she herself might go bankrupt.
94. See Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in Predicting Personal Events, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 719,
720 (1985) (discussing overconfident and underconfident evaluation of future events, and
citing research suggesting that a person might generate positive evidence for an anticipated
future occurrance to avoid the "unpleasantness of missing out on a preferred outcome").
95. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 237-40 (discussing the phenomenon of "incomplete
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Where the relationship between the prospective debtor and the
agent is primarily personal and emotional, as in the case of spouses, rather than commercial, the chance that a nondischargeability
rule will alter debtor behavior is even slimmer.' Spouses may be
especially vulnerable to one another's deceptions and susceptible to
wishful thinking about each other's character or financial prospects.' Thus, the complex relationship between spouses may easily result in a greater than ordinary risk of debtor miscalculation. In
addition, the prospective harm from the nondischargeability of particular debts may be overshadowed by a spouse's desire to avoid
acts, such as demanding access to hard facts regarding the other

heuristics," defined as problems in the mechanisms by which persons obtain and evaluate
data). Jackson argues that "[m]uch evidence indicates that the errors associated with inlead decision makers systematically to overestimate chances of
complete heuristics ...
success and to underestimate the corresponding risks." Id. at 238-39. See also DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY
(2d ed. 1990) at 758-759 (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1129-1130 (1974) (finding that
people systematically underestimate their probability of failure, and that they are unaware
of this bias)).
96. This argument does not depend on the assumption that the marital relationship
itself establishes a partnership. Rather, the point is that even in business partnerships
between spouses, the spousal relationship will tend to minimize any deterrent effect of the
Strang rule. See JOHN SCANZONI & MAXIMULIANE SZINOVACZ, FAMILY DECISION-MAKING
A DEVELOPMENTAL SEX ROLE MODEL 283 (1980) (suggesting that extralegal factors including "trust, cooperativenesS, justice, and empathy aris[ing] from earlier decisioning
experience[s]" coupled with "sex-role preferences" are the "guiding philosophy of decisionmaking"); see also IVAN BOSZORMENYI-NAGY & GERALDINE M. SPARK, INVISIBLE LOYALTIES: RECIPROCITY IN INTERGENERATIONAL FAMILY THERAPY 39-40 (1973) (concluding
that loyalty commitments between family members are "invisible but strong fibers" and
that the ultimate loyalty pertains to the maintenance of the family itself despite harmful or
damaging behavior on the part of one member toward another).
If the marital relationship itself were treated as giving rise to a partnership, the
availability of divorce under nonbankruptcy law would be exceedingly important. Any
deterrent effect Strang conceivably has would be undermined if the honest spouse were
unable to "dissolve" the partnership and disassociate from the wrongdoing spouse through
divorce.
97. This may be especially true where applicable law makes it extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to obtain a no-fault divorce. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (Michie
1991) (grounds for divorce are limited to impotence, conviction of felony, alcoholism,
adultery, separation, or failure to support); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 102-103 (West 1991)
(180 day waiting period required for divorce, unless spouses have been separated one
year, adultery is proven, or one spouse has been convicted of felony). The need to continue a matrimonial relationship may cause cognitive dissonance which could be resolved
by formulation of a more positive view of the spouse than merited. See MARVIN E.
SHAW & PHILIP R. COSTANZO, THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1970) (explaining
that part of the basic core of cognitive dissonance is that it "creates pressures to reduce
dissonance and to avoid increases in dissonance . . .").
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spouse's conduct, which might cause unpleasant disruption of a
sensitive relationship." Finally, an innocent spouse may be so
psychologically or physically dominated by the wrongdoing spouse
that any possible deterrent impact of the nondischargeability rule is
totally lost.9

Even if a nondischargeability rule could generally induce
individual partners to monitor each other more carefully, the return
from such efforts would be nominal. Negligence may be combatted
in a number of ways, including standardization of procedures,
improved training, or increased incentives. By contrast, it is exponentially more difficult to devise effective mechanisms to prevent
an agent's purposeful fraud, particularly if the agent's position
inherently provides a degree of independence.
3.

Difficulty of Proving Debtors' Personal Guilt Does Not Justify
Vicarious Liability

One might argue that Strang is justified because it is too
difficult for courts to determine whether particular debtors acted
wrongfully. The difficulty of this liability determination is obviated
if, once debt is found to have been incurred by one partner in a
manner which renders it nondischargeable to that partner, the other

98. See, e.g., Macaux v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCM) 225, 229 (1983) ("It is
unlikely that in many marriages one spouse will risk domestic violence or even sacrifice
domestic tranquility for the [accurate reporting of financial information].").
99. See ia Psychological research indicates that the coping response of the abused
spouse tends to agitation, anxiety, depression, and extreme passivity. Jerry Finn, The
Stresses and Coping Behavior of Battered Women, 66 SOCIAL CASEWoRK 341, 342
(1985). The more dependent the abused spouse, both psychologically and economically,
the more likely she is to tolerate abuse. Debra S. Kalnuss & Murray A. Straus, Wife's
Marital Dependency and Wife Abuse, 44 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 277, 278 (1982); James
C. Overholser & Sara H. Moll, Who's to Blame: Attributions Regarding Causality in
Spouse Abuse, 8 BEHAVIORAL SC. & LAW 107, 114 (1990). This behavior is based on a
pattern of "learned helplessness:" the abused's belief that any response she makes will be
ineffective in altering her situation. Finn, supra at 347. The pattern of internalization and
self-blame that often prevents the abused from seeking help is a pattern of behavior likely
to prevail in the bankruptcy situation. If anything, bankruptcy and attendant financial
problems are likely to be one of the souitce of external stress that triggers further abuse.
Id. at 341.
Of course, in extreme cases courts may find that the dominated spouse lacked sufficient capacity to consent to creation of the partnership or agency. In such scenarios a
question might still arise as to the dischargeability of vicarious debt from an apparent
agency. See, e.g., Macaux, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 227-30 (to avoid liability for the signing
of a joint return the spouse must be able to show that "he or she would not have signed
the return except for the constraint applied to his or her will." (citing Brown v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 116, 119 (1968))).
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partners are deemed to have participated in the wrongdoing. Initially, it is important to note that this potential argument in favor of
imputed liability was not mentioned in Strang or any of its progeny as a basis for the Strang rule. Presumably, this argument has
not been made because, although proving a debtor's subjective
intent can be difficult and costly,"° the public policy favoring
discharge provides a presumption that debtors are innocent and
debts dischargeable. 1'
Treating partnerships as an exception to this general rule is
inappropriate. Many partnerships, such as those with numerous
partners or offices in widely dispersed geographical areas, are composed predominately of partners who are totally unaware of what
most other partners are doing. Partners in relatively small partnerships also may, for other reasons, be unaware of their co-partners'
activities. In addition, there is no reason to believe that partners are
generally more aware of, or involved in, one another's misdeeds
than other groups of potential debtors, such as employees in a
single corporate office or shareholders or officers of a close corporation. 2
4. Inappropriate Protection for "Victimized Creditors"
The goal of preventing particular creditors from being victimized by certain debtors may best explain Strang. However, if this
were the only applicable rationale, the often repeated distinction between honest and dishonest debtors would be irrelevant. Under
Strang, a court's focus in determining dischargeability would be on
the creditor and whether or not the creditor was victimized, not on
the debtor and whether or not the debtor was "honest.""°3
100. The fact that a creditor need only establish its case by a preponderance of the
evidence in any event minimizes the need for an irrebuttable presumption of debtors' guilt
as a means of protecting creditors. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659-60 (1991)
(holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard accords with the Congressional
intent behind the promulgation of the § 523 discharge exceptions).
101. See supra notes 1-4.
102. Note that the corporate veil does not shield officers or employees who engage in
fraudulent conduct from personal liability for debts incurred as a result of that conduct.
See, e.g., Klockner v. Keser, 488 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Colo. Ct. App.) (holding corporate directors and officers personally liable for fraudulently misrepresenting to a creditor that the
corporation had sufficient funds to cover checks presented to the creditor), reh'g denied,
488 P.2d 1135, cert. denied, 488 P.2d 1135 (Colo. 1971); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINESS ENTERPRISES § 232 (3d ed.

1983) (noting officers' personal liability for fraudulent securities issue).
103. See Kennedy, supra note 47, at 896. "The exceptions from dischargeability [of
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Even assuming the key to Strang is avoidance of creditor
victimization, more needs to be said. The honest debtor did not
victimize the creditor; why then should the honest debtor be denied
a discharge of the debt? The argument that the innocent debtor
may have benefited from the wrongdoing is inadequate.'0 4 Debtors typically benefit from the debt they incur; otherwise few would
choose to incur debt. Nonetheless, debt is ordinarily dischargeable.
Furthermore, the vicariously liable debtor may not have benefited
from the debt, or may have benefited to an extent less than the
full amount of the debt.°5
Perhaps the Strang rule is based on the principle that no debtor has a right to a bankruptcy discharge.) In formulating discharge policy, there is an inherent balancing of equities between

specific debts incurred through a partner's wrongful acts] are not designed so much to
affect the conduct of the bankrupt as they are to protect certain classes of creditors from
loss of their just claims even as against an honest, deserving, but financially distressed
debtor." Id. Nonetheless, Professor Kennedy does not explain why there is a policy preference in favor of this particular class of creditors as opposed to other classes of creditors
such as tort victims, many of whom never voluntarily dealt with the debtor.
104. The Strang Court spoke of the debtor's benefit as an additional, and apparently
unnecessary, circumstance. Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555, 561 (1885).
Each partner was the agent and representative of the finn with reference to all
business within the scope of the partnership. And if, in the conduct of partnership business, and with reference thereto, one partner makes false or fraudulent
misrepresentations of fact to the injury of innocent persons who deal with him
as representing the firm, and without notice of any limitations upon his general
authority, his partners cannot escape pecuniary responsibility therefor upon the
ground that such misrepresentations were made without their knowledge. This is
especially so when, as in the case before us, the partners, who were not themselves guilty of wrong, received and appropriated the fruits of the fraudulent
conduct of their associate in business.
Id. (emphasis added).
Logically, the fact that the innocent partner obtained some benefit should be irrelevant. The benefit received by the debtor often may be a fraction of her vicarious liability.
See, e.g., First Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Luce (In re Luce), 109 B.R. 202, 206 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding husband's fraud in obtaining $475,533 rendered wife's debt
nondischargeable, even absent evidence she received any of the funds). If receipt of benefit is a relevant factor, perhaps it should serve as a cap on the amount of debt not dis-

charged.
105. For example, a partner might obtain a loan on the partnership's account by fraud,
then abscond or waste the funds. The probability of this scenario may increase in the
marital context, at least in cases where one spouse is consistently dominant psychologically, economically, or physically. See Beck, supra note 25, at 348-56.
106. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973) (holding that the right to discharge of debt in bankruptcy is not fundamental).
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prospective debtors and creditors. Strang construes Congressional
intent as favoring creditors who have been victims of wrongdoing.
Once the wrongdoing is established, it does not matter that the
particular debtor was not responsible for it. The debtor's liability is
simply not to be forgiven in light of the policy preference for
assisting victimized creditors.
Unfortunately, this interpretation of Strang also leaves troublesome questions unanswered. For example, if the focus should be
on the wrong suffered by the victim rather than the debtor's moral
culpability, why should debts for negligent torts, at least where
serious physical injury results, be dischargeable? There is no obvious basis for extending greater sympathy to one who is defrauded
into entering a transaction with the debtor than to one who is
harmed without ever having agreed to deal with the debtor. Even
assuming some meaningful distinction between these two classes of
victim, why was this distinction so clear to the Strang Court that
the justices did not have to identify it?
C.

Frustrates the Fresh Start Doctrine

The fresh start doctrine is designed to help debtors, creditors,
and society at large. Thus, it provides the fundamental justification
for bankruptcy
law. Strang frustrates every objective of the doe10 7
trine.
A bankruptcy discharge functions as a final societal safety net
for honest debtors. The denial of discharge for vicariously incurred
debt eliminates this protection, allowing innocent debtors to be
dashed on the rocks below. Strang exposes debtors to considerable
potential damage: a partner's fraud could result in staggering f'man-

107. See, e.g., Thatcher v. Austin (In re Austin), 36 B.R. 306, 312 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1984).
[A]pplication of vicarious liability would effectively vitiate the § 523(a)(6)
requirement that only debts resulting from willfid acts committed by the debtor
be nondischargeable. Vicarious liability as a social policy or legal fiction ignores the master's knowledge and imposes fault and financial responsibility
without regard to culpability or intent. Section 523(a)(6) is founded on the
contrary notion that only a debt resulting from the deliberate acts of the debtor
can be excepted from discharge in bankruptcy.
Id. See also Alden State Bank v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 29 B.R. 184, 191 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1983) (stating that an innocent partner should not be held liable for a dishonest partner's fraud because the purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide relief to honest
debtors).
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cial liability. Moreover, the modem development of huge international partnerships not only increases the number of prospective
innocent debtor-partners, it diminishes the likelihood that any parcould effectively monitor the conduct of fellow
ticular partner
08
partners.1
Another objective of the fresh start doctrine is to motivate
debtors to engage in conduct which will minimize creditors' losses.
By reducing or eliminating the benefits of discharge, Strang discourages debtors from such activity, harming creditors as a result.
For instance, prospective debtors saddled with Strang debt are discouraged from voluntarily filing bankruptcy. Instead, they are more
likely to choose high-risk economic options in last ditch efforts to
rescue their finances. A more generous dischargeability rule could
convince debtors to file bankruptcy in a timely manner, to the
benefit of all concerned.
Similarly, debtors who learn of their partner's fraud or willful
misconduct are deterred from disclosing that information because
the evidence of wrongfulness will result in nondischargeable debt
for the disclosing partner. Without such data, many victims could
go uncompensated and perpetrators unpunished. Making the honest
debtor's vicarious debt dischargeable would encourage disclosure,
at least where the debtor has already filed bankruptcy."°9
The fresh start policy also promotes overall societal welfare by
encouraging debtors to become full and productive economic actors. Elimination of Strang may motivate debtors to be more productive economically by reducing their post-bankruptcy financial
burdens." Regardless of the potential for positive motivation,
however, the burden imposed on debtors by Strang's continued
vitality inhibits the success of the fresh start doctrine's societal

108. The problem of a principal's inability to monitor an agent's activities is not limited
to the partnership context. Arguably, a similar increase in reliance on agents in other
settings leads to analogous difficulties.
109. If the debtor becomes aware of a partner's fraud prior to filing bankruptcy, the
debtor might still be hesitant to disclose the information because of the threat of vicarious
liability under agency or partnership law. Furthermore, awareness of such fraud prior to
filing would probably render the nondisclosing partner-debtor a morally culpable participant whose debt would be denied discharge based on the debtor's own conduct.
110. Some have argued, without empirical support, that as a result of psychological
devastation the debtor might be inhibited from pursuing productive work and become a
costly ward of the state. See Zeigler, Note, supra note 10, at 910 ("The fraud exception
inhibits the fraudulent debtor's productivity after bankruptcy by compromising his fresh
start."). To the extent, if any, that this contention is correct, it militates against retention
of a purposeless nondischargeability rule.
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welfare goal.
D.

Fundamental Unfairness

The Strang doctrine is fundamentally unfair because it essentially punishes the innocent debtor for something another person
did. Many courts and commentators have recognized the unfairness
of such punishment in connection with the nonbankruptcy vicarious
liability rule."' A nondischargeability rule is more acutely inequitable than a mere liability rule because of the bankruptcy debtor's
relative vulnerability. Denial of discharge strips the innocent, desperate debtor of her very last legal protection."' The Strang rule
is especially unfair because, as already discussed, it offers no policy benefits to offset its harsh, even brutal, bite."'
E. Inequity in the Spousal Context
Application of Strang in the spousal context is especially
unrealistic and oppressive. First, since some states do not allow
unrestricted, no-fault divorce, innocent spouses may be trapped
involuntarily in an "agency" relationship. Although marriage alone
may not legally create a partnership, many of the typical activities

111. See, e.g., Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 381, 386
(Minn. 1987) (allowing innocent partners to recover proportionate interest in insurance
policy when one partner intentionally destroyed partnership property); Randy S. Parlee, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: Suggested Changes in the Law Through Policy
Analysis, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 27, 30-31 (1984).
Because vicarious liability runs counter to the deeply ingrained fault principle in
the law of torts, the doctrine has been "viewed with suspicion and accepted
with misgivings." As Justice Holmes stated: "I assume that common-sense [sic]
is opposed to making one man pay for another man's wrong, unless he actually
has brought the wrong to pass according to the ordinary canons of legal responsibility .... "
Id. at 31 (footnotes omitted). See also Robert J. Stem & D. Jackson Loughhead, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: The Worst Side of a Questionable Doctrine, 54 DEF.
COUNs. J. 29, 32-33 (1987) (arguing that punitive damages are unfair punishment when
imposed vicariously).
112. See William C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection System,
1979 Wis. L. REV. 1047, 1100 & n.198 (explaining that exemption statutes protect the
debtor by limiting the risks of borrowing and allowing him to retain minimum property in
the event of bankruptcy); Zeigler, Note, supra note 10, at 895 n.19 (discussing discharge
as a paternalistic "safety net" that protects the debtor by lessening the risk of seeking
credit).
113. See supra notes 60-74, 91-106 and accompanying text (Parts HI(A)(1), EI(B)).
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of married couples, such as the sale of jointly-owned property or
the use by one spouse of property nominally owned by the other,
could be regarded as establishing an agency relationship between
the parties.' 14 The timely proof of fault necessary to dissolve the
"agency" relationship may be impossible, in such situations.
Second, as argued above,115 the social dynamics of a marriage are far more complex than those of a typical partnership or
agency. Therefore, many debtors may have no meaningful way to
control their respective spouses. The specter of possible post-bankruptcy liability would be unlikely to motivate a passive spouse,
unsuspecting of the family's financial demise and unwilling to
incur her spouse's wrath, to participate actively in supervising or
monitoring the family's financial affairs." 6 Even if divorce is a
legal possibility, the psychological, emotional, and financial facets
of the marital relationship may prevent a spouse from perceiving
divorce as a meaningful alternative." 7 Application of the Strang

114. See, e.g., Fluehr v. Paolino (In re Paolino), 89 B.R. 453, 460 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988) (applying the Pennsylvania state law's presumption of spousal agency in transactions
related to property owned by the entireties); Shelton v. Wells (In re Shelton), 28 B.R.
218, 222 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983) (imputing a husband's fraud to his wife, even though
the wife did not participate in negotiations to exchange jointly-owned property with third
parties, because each would benefit from sale and they could be considered joint venturers); Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re Ponmerer), 10 B.R. 935, 940 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1981) (holding an innocent wife's liability for her spouse's fraud
nondischargeable because the defendant husband and wife "do not contend that a husbandwife agency relationship did not exist" in connection with their faring operations); cf. In
re Tara of North Hills, 116 B.R. 455, 462 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ("Whereas a wife is not the
the court believes
agent of her husband strictly by force of the marital relationship ....
the mutual confidence usually associated with such relationship to be relevant to the issue
of agency, just as would friendship or enemity [sic] between persons." (citations omitted)),
aff'd 904 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Krokos, 12 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981) (finding that spouses operating a "mom and pop" grocery store were partners and,
therefore, could not file a Chapter 13 petition jointly as individuals).
115. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
116. It is objectionable in a nonbankruptcy setting that one spouse would be deprived
of the power to participate meaningfully in financial decisions affecting the family. To
employ a fiction attributing to debtors lacking such power the fraudulent decisions made
by their spouses and to deprive them of the benefits of a bankruptcy discharge seems
unconscionable folly.
117. The honest spouse's post-divorce economic prospects may be extremely unattractive,
depending upon the state's rules regarding property division and alimony as well as the
dishonest spouse's prospects for economic success. See, e.g., Lenore I. Weitzman, The
Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and
Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1251-52 (1981) (noting that due to a
marked difference in post-divorce standards of living between men and women (one Califonrda study showed a 42% increase for men and a 73% decrease for women), divorced
women report having constant, severe financial difficulties and having "more stress and
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rule in such circumstances would simply punish an innocent spouse
for failing to take heroic steps to change the intra-family power
structure.118
Little information is available to explain the degree to which
family-run enterprises or family "joint" financial transactions are
dominated by a spouse of a particular gender. 9 If there is a
gender-based prejudice in marital relationships, another disadvantage of the Strang doctrine is that it would contribute to the economic exploitation of the dominated gender as a class.12 °
less satisfaction with their lives than any other group of Americans" (footnotes omitted)).
118. Often the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy courts seem either to ignore or
misperceive the actual, or desirable, socio-psychological context of marriage. Consider a
recent case in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a wife's reliance on
her husband's representations did not constitute excusable neglect justifying leave to file a
proof of claim after the bar date. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Dilkes (In re Analytical
Systems, Inc.), 933 F.2d 939 (11th Cir. 1991). The wife, Dilkes, and her wholly-owned
company were creditors of Analytical Systems, whose sole shareholder was the husband,
Dunning. Id. at 940. On reconsideration of its initial decision, the bankruptcy court found
excusable neglect based on a breach of the confidential marital relationship by Dunning
when he failed to inform Dilkes that her claim had been reduced on the debtor's books.
Id. at 941. The circuit court, after declaring that it would not allow a late filing based
"solely on the grounds of equity," id. at 942, concluded that "any breach of the confidential marital relationship 6 between husband and wife resulting from Dilkes' reliance on
Dunning's statements does not constitute excusable neglect." Id. at 943. In its footnote
six, the court made the following curious comment:
[I]n the context of contemporary
pursuing respective business and
cial level, any other rule would
plicit in the rules of commercial
Bankruptcy Code and Rules.

life where husbands and wives frequently are
professional lives that intersect on a commerignore the separation of home and office imconduct (and common sense) reflected in the

Id. at 943 n.6.
The exact thrust of the court's remarks is unclear. However, the comments indicate
that the court believes the circumstances underlying the actual socio-psychological relationship between spouses should be ignored in favor of inflexible rules which recognize a
"separation of home and office."
119. See generally Phyllis N. Hallenbeck, An Analysis of Power Dynamics in Marriage,
1966 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 200 passim (discussing studies dealing with the distribution of
power in marriages). Some theorists argue that the respective earning power of the spouses is a significant factor in controlling family enterprises. Id. at 200. Census statistics
suggest that the earning power of men is consistently greater than that of women. For
example, among full-time workers 18 years and older, men earn an average of 59% more
than women. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNrrED STATES, 455, Table 737 (1990).
120. See sources cited supra notes 96-99, 119 (suggesting that women, as a class, are
relatively disempowered). Although formal proof for this proposition may be scant, the
proposition that women are disempowered is consistent with what this author believes to
be the generally held perception of reality.
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F. Inconsistent Treatment of Other Vicarious Debt
The dischargeability of vicarious debt arises in at least two
contexts outside the scope of Strang: (1) Section 523(a)(6) liability
for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor;" 2 1 and, (2) Section 523(a)(9) liability for certain consequences of the "debtor's
operation of a motor vehicle."" The few Bankruptcy Code cases
on point have consistently construed these two provisions to allow
discharge of an innocent party's vicariously acquired debt.
1. Section 523(a)(6)

-

"Willful and malicious injury"

Most reported cases have construed section 523(a)(6) as allowing discharge of debts acquired vicariously as a result of another's
willful and malicious conduct, notwithstanding an early, pre-Code
Supreme Court decision, McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, declaring such
debts to be nondischargeable. 1 3 Close examination of section
523(a)(6) cases suggests that they are fundamentally inconsistent
with the Strang doctrine's treatment of vicarious debts arising from

121. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).
123. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916). For cases construing § 523(a)(6) as
allowing discharge, see infra note 136; see also St. Luke's Hospitals of Fargo, Inc. v.
Smith (In re Smith), 119 B.R. 714, 721 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990) (stating, naively, that all
cases addressing the issue have allowed discharge of vicariously acquired debt under
§ 523 generally). But see Bear, Steams & Co. v. Powell (In re Powell), 95 B.R. 236,
240 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (denying discharge under both 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2) & (6), and
specifically adopting the reasoning of "numerous cases" imputing agent's fraud to principal), aff'd 108 B.R. 343 (S.D. Fla. 1989), af'd, 914 F.2d 268 (11th Cir. 1990).
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially applied McIntyre in § 523(a)(6)
cases, it subsequently questioned this "broad proposition." LaTrattoria, Inc. v. Lansford (In
re Lansford), 822 F.2d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra note 20. Courts frequently,
but not invariably, applied McIntyre to statutory predecessors of § 523(a)(6). Compare
Industrie Aeronautiche E. Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggo, S.p.A. v. Kasler (In re Kasler), 611
F.2d 308, 309-10 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979); Frank v. Michigan Paper Co., 179 F. 776, 779 (4th
Cir. 1919); and Aldis v. Brown (In re Brown), 412 F. Supp. 1066, 1070-71 (W.D. Okla.
1975) (citing agency relationship between debtor and intentional wrongdoer as one ground
for denial of discharge) with In re Rutkowskl, 2 B.R. 677, 679 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(finding no proof of debtor's active participation in intentional wrongdoing without explaining why such proof was required under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17a(2)). In
construing earlier versions of the current code, as in cases under § 523 itself, courts also
characterized debtors' negligent acts as willful in order to deny discharge. E.g., In re
Papale, 17 F. Supp. 146, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (denying discharge of a parent's debt for a
child's act because permitting the child to possess and shoot an air rifle was an act of
wanton and willful negligence). For a discussion of characterization as a means of denying discharge under § 523, see infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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another's fraud. Comparing these cases with McIntyre, which treats
circumstances similar to those found in the section 523(a)(6) cases
in accord with the Strang doctrine, clarifies the nature of this inconsistency.
a. McIntyre v Kavanaugh24
Thirty-one years after Strang," the Supreme Court interpreted section 17(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898" in McIntyre v.
Kavanaugh.27 The act stated that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy
shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such
as... (2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the
person or property of another.. .. ""
The McIntyre defendants were partners in a partnership which
converted property belonging to the plaintiffs.129 One partner argued that he did not participate in the conversion and that any
liability he might incur for the conversion was discharged in his
.. personal bankruptcy proceeding.' The Court rejected this contention, declaring that "[i]f under the circumstances here presented
the firm inflicted a wilful [sic] and malicious injury to property ... [the allegedly innocent partner] incurred liability for that
character of wrong.''. Finding that conversion was "a wilful
[sic] and malicious injury to property" of another, the Court concluded that the debt, even of the allegedly innocent partner, was
32
nondischargeable. 1
McIntyre, like Strang, ignores the logic underlying Neal and
fails to address the relevant policy considerations before denying a
discharge to innocent partners.' 33 Instead of focusing on the
bankruptcy policy favoring discharge, McIntyre and Strang analyze
vicarious liability under nonbankruptcy rules and then baldly state

124. 242 U.S. 138 (1916).
125. Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885).
126. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended by Act, ch. 487, 32
Stat. 798 (1903).
127. 242 U.S. 138.
128. ch. 487, 32 Stat. at 798.
129. McIntyre, 242 U.S. at 138-39.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 142.
133. Id.
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that the resulting debt is nondischargeable. The cases following
Strang and McIntyre do little to advance the analysis. To evaluate
the McIntyre approach, it is necessary to examine the policies
underlying the nonbankruptcy vicarious liability rule and contrast
them with "those forming the basis for the bankruptcy
nondischargeability rule.
b.

Section 523(a)(6)

Cases

Most of the reported cases construing section 523(a)(6) have
held debtors' vicarious liability for the "willful and malicious"
actions of another dischargeable." s Two basic reasons have been
advanced for this conclusion.
A number of courts circumvented the McIntyre analog of the
Strang rule by relying on the specific language of subsequent statutes. McIntyre dealt with debts arising from wrongful and willful
injury. Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code specifies that
debts "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor" are
nondischargeable.3 5 This language has been construed to apply
only where the willfulness and malice were actually that of the
debtor, rather than merely inferred from the actions of the debtor's
13

agent.

134. See cases cited infra note 136.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (emphasis added).
136. Jones v. Whitacre (In re Whitacre), 93 B.R. 584, 585 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)
(declining to impute child's intent to parents because of the "by the debtor" language);
Yelton v. Eggers (In re Eggers), 51 B.R. 452, 454 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding,
because of "by the debtor" language, a son's intent is not imputable to his mother despite
the state's vicarious liability law); Bowse v. Cornell (In re Cornell), 42 B.R. 860, 862-63
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984) (holding that even if the actions of the debtor's son were
intentional, there was no basis under statute, case law, or the facts of the case to impute
liability to his parents); Thatcher v. Austin (In re Austin), 36 B.R. 306, 309-11 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1984) (holding that under the language of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) the liability
of a rock concert promotor is dischargeable even if a death is caused willfully and maliciously by a concert patron for whose conduct the debtor is vicariously liable under
nonbancruptcy law); Elimore v. Davis (In re Davis), 23 B.R. 633, 635 (Bnkr. W.D. Ky.
1982) (allowing discharge of a sheriff's debt from a personal injury judgment because the
staff member/tortfeasor's intent was not imputable to the sheriff); see also Ordmann v.
Hoppa (In re Hoppa), 31 B.R. 753, 754-55 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983) (holding that an
employer's debt for the drunk driving liability of an employee is dischargeable notwithstanding 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)); cf. Gray v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 77 B.R 972, 973
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding a car owner's vicarious liability for debt caused by his
daughter's drunken driving dischargeable because 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) refers only to
debts arising out of "the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle . . ."); Modem Distrib.,
Inc. v. Gray (In re Gray), 22 B.R. 676, 680 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (focusing on new
"intent to deceive" language in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)). But cf. In re Papale, 17 F.
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Courts construing section 523(a)(6) have also relied on the
fresh start policy in deciding that vicarious liability is dischargeable. The courts argue that the fresh start policy is' designed to
distinguish between honest and dishonest debtors and that denying
a discharge of vicarious debt would contravene this objective. 37
c.

Contrast to Strang

Under section 523(a)(6), if an innocent partner is vicariously
liable for her partner's willful and malicious injury to another, the
resulting debt is dischargeable. On the other hand, under the Strang
doctrine, if the innocent partner is vicariously liable for her
partner's fraud the vicariously acquired debt cannot be discharged.
In fact, under section 523(a)(6) the vicarious liability is dischargeable even when the debtor-partner acted negligently, and that negligence facilitated the wrongful partner's conduct. Yet under Strang,
the vicarious debt of a non-negligent, completely innocent partner
is not discharged. In both the section 523(a)(6) case and the case
governed by the Strang doctrine, the debtors are partners of the
persons directly responsible for the debts, and those directly responsible persons acted wrongfully and intentionally in acquiring
the debts. No apparent policy justifies treating these classes of
cases differently.
The statutory construction argument asserted by courts in
section 523(a)(6) cases to avoid Strang and McIntyre is by itself
unpersuasive. 3 ' There seems to be no reference in the legislative
history of section 523(a)(6) which expressly purports to overrule
McIntyre.139 In addition, under the old partnership model, the

Supp. 146, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (denying discharge of parents' debt for their child's act
because the act was the result of the parent's wanton and willful negligence (construing
predecessor statute to § 523(a)(6))).
137. One court specifically stated that there is nothing in the legislative history of 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) to suggest that the nonbankruptcy vicarious liability rule was to be
"appended to the statutory exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy." Austin, 36 B.R. at 312.
"Quite the contrary, application of vicarious liability would effectively vitiate the
§ 523(a)(6) requirement that only debts resulting from willfI acts committed by the debtor be nondischargeable." I
138. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (Part fl(EF)(1)(b)). An additional
analytical element will be added which makes the statutory argument as to § 523(a)(6)
and 523(a)(9) more credible. See infra notes 171-90 and accompanying text (Part V(A)).
This statutory argument will be used to bolster the conclusion that vicarious liability for
fraudulent debt is also dischargeable, notwithstanding the construction applied to section
523(a)(2) under Strang.
139. See, e.g., Fluehr v. Paolino (In re Paolino), 75 B.R. 641, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
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willful and malicious act of the wrongful partner is the willful and
malicious act of the "innocent" partner. Consequently, the resultant
vicarious liability will be liability for acts "by" the innocent partner. Furthermore, the special emphasis placed on section
523(a)(6)'s "by the debtor" language ignores similar language in
the predecessor to section 523(a)(2) construed by the Strang court.
The statute considered in Strang referred to "debt created by the
This language seems the
fraud... of the bankrupt .... ."
functional equivalent of "fraud by the debtor." 41 Yet Strang interpreted this language as including fraud for which the debtor was
only vicariously liable. Therefore, Congress' choice of language for
section 523(a)(6) virtually identical to that in Strang should be read
as affirming the analogous McIntyre decision, not overruling it.
Finally, if the statutory construction argument is determinative,
two different rules would apply under section 523(a)(2) regarding
discharge of debts arising from fraud. Section 523(a)(2)(A) refers
generally to "any debt for money, property, [or] services ... to
the extent obtained by false pretences, a false representation, or
,,.." Because this section does not explicitly
actual fraud .
state that the benefit represented by the debt had to be obtained
"by the debtor," a debtor's vicarious liability for such debts obtained by a partner's fraud could remain nondischargeable.
In contrast, section 523(a)(2)(B)(iv) refers to "any debt...
for money, property, [or] services . . . to the extent obtained by
the use of a statement in writing that the debtor caused to be
made or published .... ."4 3 This provision's reference to the
debtor's actions could be read to allow a discharge for vicarious
debt. However, no legislative discussion explains why the fresh
start policy would support different treatment of vicarious liability
for fraud in scenarios covered by two subsections of the same
provision.
2.

Section 523(a)(9)

Section 523(a)(9) declares certain debts arising out of "the

1987)
140.
141.
142.
143.

(finding no reference to Mclntyre in legislative history).
Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555, 556 (1885) (emphasis added).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
I1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)(iv) (emphasis added).
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debtor's operation of a motor vehicle" nondischargeable.'" Limited case law on point states that vicarious liability for another
person's operation of a motor vehicle is dischargeable.145 The
policy basis for discharge of such vicariously acquired debts is the
fresh start doctrine."4 The fresh start doctrine similarly justifies
the discharge of vicarious debt arising out of another's fraud.
3.

Reflections

Even if the dischargeability of vicarious liability under sections 523(a)(6) and 523(a)(9) is logically inconsistent with denial of
discharge of vicarious debts under section 523(a)(2), the inconsistency alone does not indicate which of the two rules should be
changed. 4 7 Nevertheless, the fact of the inconsistency demonstrates, at least, the unfairness faced by debtors who find their
vicarious debts governed by section 523(a)(2) compared with those
similarly situated who, fortuitously, find themselves within the
scope of sections 523(a)(6) or 523(a)(9).
G. Generates Miscellaneous Costs
Before proceeding to survey the current status of Strang and
the prospects for change, the article will consider a few of the
nondischargeability rule's incidental analytical and pragmatic costs
which defy neat categorization. Courts have exhibited confusion
regarding the rationale and applicability of Strang ever since the
decision was initially rendered. This judicial confusion has led to a
variety of problems.
Many courts limited the impact of Strang, and McIntyre, by
distinguishing between denial of discharge for a particular debt and
denial of a global discharge. Under Strang, an innocent partner
would be denied discharge of any debts related to her partner's
intentional fraud, but the innocent partner would retain the right to
discharge of unrelated debts regardless of vicarious responsibility

144. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).
145. Eg., Gray v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 77 B.R. 972, 973 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (discharging a car owner's debt attributable to his daughter's drunken driving because 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) refers only to debts arising out of "the debtor's operation of a motor
vehicle . . .").

146. Lewis, 77 B.R. at 973 (stating that extensive vicarious liability due to automobile
accidents is contrary to the "fresh start" policy of bankruptcy law).
147. Other criticisms of the Strang rule discussed in this part argue compellingly for
repudiation of the nondischargeability rule.
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for her partner's wrongful conduct." Thus, even if her partner
committed an act which specifically results in denial of a global
discharge under the statute for the wrongful partner, the innocent
debtor is entitled to a discharge. The policy justification for this
distinction between debts, which contradicts the multi-handed
monolith partnership model underlying Strang, has never been
adequately explained. 49 Repudiation of Strang would tie off this

148. Courts citing Strang and/or McIntyre applied such a limitation. See, e.g., In re
Lovich, 117 F.2d 612, 614 (2nd Cir. 1941) (stating that the fraud of an authorized business agent in obtaining a debt for partners may be imputed to the partners for the purpose of holding them liable for the debt without affecting their right to a discharge of
other debts under the Bankruptcy Act); Frank v. Michigan Paper Co., 179 F. 776, 780
(4th Cir. 1910) (concluding that global discharge in bankruptcy cannot be denied to partners on the basis that one debt was incurred through the fraudulent representations of one
partner); Hardie v. Swafford, 165 F. 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1908) (holding that discharge of
an innocent partner's debts has no effect on his liability for debts created by his partner's
fraud); Love v. Smith (In re Smith), 98 B.R. 423, 426 (Bankr. C.D. 111.1989) (holding
that an agent's fraud is imputable to the principal to preclude dischargeability of particular
debt, but not to preclude a general discharge of unrelated debts); Fluehr v. Paolino (In re
Paolino), 75 B.R. 641, 647-49 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (maintaining a distinction between
the debtor's own wrongful conduct, resulting in denial of a general discharge, and wrongful conduct by the debtor's agent, resulting in denial of discharge of a specific debt);
Walker v. Citizens Bank (In re Walker), 53 B.R. 174, 177-81 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985)
on remand from 726 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1984) (approving a rule that the fraud of an
authorized agent will render debts incurred as a result of the fraud nondischargeable, but
that without proof of knowledge or reckless disregard on the part of the principal, a
general discharge may not be denied); Modem Distrib., Inc. v. Gray (In re Gray), 22
B.P. 676, 679 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (stating that, in enacting the new Code, Congress
chose to eliminate the use of a false financial statement as grounds for denying a discharge in bankruptcy to an innocent partner, but to retain it as grounds for denying discharge of a particular debt of the innocent partner regardless of that partner's lack of
knowledge or intent to deceive by the fraudulent acts of the other partner); In re Maloof,
2 F.2d 373, 374 (N.D. Ga. 1924) (denying discharge to debt acquired by agent's fraud,
but noting that denial of global discharge would extend a benefit to creditors not entitled
to it, thus inflicting unwarranted punishment on the debtor); see also Kennedy, supra note
47, at 895-96 (distinguishing denial of global discharge and denial of discharge of specific
debts based on contrasting policies of deterrence and protection of specific creditor classes). But see In re Fineberg, 36 F.2d 392, 393 (W.D.N.Y. 1929) (stating that each partner
is the agent of the copartners and, thus, an innocent partners general discharge may be
denied based on imputed fraud).
149. The denial of a global discharge has been characterized as a punishment. In re
Hyman, 97 F. 195, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1899). The same has been said of the
nondischargeability of particular debts. See, e.g., Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Case,
755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that "one of the purposes of the fraud
exceptions to discharge is to punish the debtor for engaging in fraudulent conduct");
Shuchman, supra note 83, at 739 (arguing that "[t]he denial of . . . discharge for a
fraudulently procured debt may be best understood from the bankrupt's point of view as a
form of civil punishment for his fraud"). One could argue that if the debtor's personal
wrongdoing is not required for one punishment (denial of discharge for particular debts),
it should not be required for the other (denial of global discharge). See, e.g., In re
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analytical loose end.
Rather than impute fraud based on pure agency principles, a
number of courts have based their refusal to discharge debts on the
debtor's alleged "reckless indifference" for the truth."5° Traditionally, a debtor's reckless disregard for the truth has been sufficient
to establish her intent to deceive and to render a resultant debt
nondischargeable."5 l The problem is that in order to avoid the
distasteful Strang doctrine and its McIntyre corollary, some courts
seem to have characterized mere negligence as reckless disregard.'3 2 Not only is this result unfair for the specific debtors in-

Meyers, 105 F. 353, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1900) (stating that, but for earlier precedent, the court
would have denied the principal's general discharge based on an agent's fraud). But see
Walker, 53 B.R. at 179 (arguing that a distinction is reasonable).
150. E.g., Walker v. Citizens State Bank (In re Walker), 726 F.2d 452, 454 (8th Cir.
1984) (implying a negligence standard by declaring that an agent's fraud is imputed to
the principal for purposes of finding debt nondischargeable if the principal "knew or
shbuld have known" of the fraud); David v. Annapolis Banking & Trust Co., 209 F.2d
343, 344 (4th Cir. 1953) (denying discharge to wife who signed fraudulent loan documents in reliance on her husband since such reliance constituted "reckless disregard" for
the truth); American Inv. Bank, N.A. v. Hosking (In re Hosking), 89 B.R. 971, 977
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding a debt nondischargeable because the debtor showed
"reckless indifference" for the truth by signing false loan documents prepared by his
agents without first reading them (citing Walker, 726 F.2d 452)); Cory v. Futscher (In re
Futscher), 58 B.R. 14, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (denying discharge of debt when a
debtor was -recklessly indifferent" to acts of her agent by allowing the agent to continue
to operate the business after the debtor expressed "suspicion" regarding the agent's honesty and integrity); Gray, 22 B.R. at 680 (declaring that "the current law would seem at a
minimum to support holding a debtor liable where he had seen the financial statement
and the errors were such that he knew or should have known of their falsity"). But see
North Shore Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Jones (In re Jones), 88 B.R. 899, 903 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that a wife's signature on false loan statements did not render
her debt nondischargeable, even though she failed to read them, since her signature was
not vital to the loan renewal).
151. See, e.g., Selfreliance Credit Union v. Harasymniw (In re Harasymiw), 895 F.2d
1170, 1171 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant's "reckless disregard for the accuracy of her representations was enough to establish a knowing intent to deceive"); Case,
755 F.2d at 1476 (holding that "reckless disregard for the truth . . . constitutes a 'false
representation' under [11 U.S.C.] § 523(a)(2)(A) . . .").
152. E.g., Walker, 726 F.2d at 454 (equating "knew or should have known" standard
with reckless disregard for the truth); Futscher, 58 B.R. at 16 (holding debt
nondischargeable when the debtor negligently continued to employ someone after harboring
suspicions regarding the employee's honesty); see also Smith, 98 B.R. at 426 (implying
that a wife was negligent in allowing her husband, who had a criminal record, to operate
a business under her name). But see Wallingford's Inc. v. Waning (In re Waning), 120
B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. D. Me. 1990) (noting that reckless disregard should suffice under
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) only where it is evident that debtor intended to deceive). For a
discussion of judicial and legislative definitions of "reckless," see generally Edwin H.
Byrd, HI, Comment, Reflections on Willful, Wanton, Reckless, and Gross Negligence, 48
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volved, but it constitutes dangerously misleading precedent which
could be misused to erroneously deny discharge for debts where no
one, neither principal nor agent, had actual evil intent.
The Strang doctrine is also wasteful. While the rule does not
promote substantially any legitimate purpose, it is costly to the
public and burdensome on the bankruptcy system. Significant systemic costs associated with nondischargeability litigation and postbankruptcy collection efforts, ranging from the salaries of court
personnel to the adverse ramifications of delay in other pending
cases, are not borne by the creditor-plaintiffs. 53 Consequently,
plaintiffs are encouraged to initiate a large volume of litigation
with attempts to prove fraud by debtor's partners or other agents.
Proving an agent's bad faith usually requires circumstantial or
indirect evidence. This type of litigation can be especially costly.
While the same criticism could be leveled against all
dischargeability
litigation,"
the difference
is that the
nondischargeability of an honest debtor's vicarious liability for an
agent's wrongdoing not only serves no worthwhile purpose but is
counter-productive. For this reason the expense is unacceptable.
IV.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE STRANG DOCTRINE

Having determined that the Strang doctrine is not soundly
based on the policy principles underlying either the vicarious liability rule or the bankruptcy nondischargeability rule, one must next
identify the adverse ramifications of the doctrine. This necessitates
a review of courts' treatment of Strang.

LA. L. REV. 1383, 1385-89, 1391-1402 (1988) (discussing the meaning and interpretation

of "willful," "wanton," "reckless" and "gross negligence" in relation to Louisiana statues
and case law).
153. Litigants in such other cases are not afforded the opportunity to buy a higher
priority on the court calendar, and even if litigants were given the opportunity to do so,
it is possible that non-litigants may also be adversely affected by a delay in the case.
154. Cost is one of the factors cited by authorities suggesting elimination of most discharge exceptions. See, e.g., John C. Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW &
COMTENM. PROBS., Autumn 1977 at 107, 111 (noting a potential "net social gain from
terminating costly collection actions, excusing the debts, and giving the poorer-but-wiser
debtor a second chance"); Zeigler, Note, supra note 10 at 904 (explaining that proof of a
debtor's fraudulent acts is costly not only because of the time and resources expended on
litigation, but also because it distracts the court from its primary task of distributing the
debtor's assets among the creditors). But cf. Steven H. Resnicoff, Barring Bankruptcy
Banditry: Revision of Section 523(a)(2)(C), 7 Bankr. Dev. L 427, 440 (1990) (arguing that

a creditor's right to object to a discharge should not be denied merely because of inherent litigation costs).
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An apparent majority of courts addressing the issue have continued to rule that an innocent debtor's liability for her agent's
wrongdoing is nondischargeable.15 s Other courts, including many

155. See, e.g., Impulsora Del Territorio Sur v. Cecchini (In re Cecchini), 780 F.2d
1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding an innocent debtor's liability for partner's fraud
nondischargeable); Industrie Aeronautiche E. Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio S.p.A. v. Kasler
(In re Kasler), 611 F.2d 308, 309-10 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that if debts are incurred as a result of willful and malicious statements made by agents, then the debts are
nondischargeable as to the principals (citing McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138));
Aldis v. Brown (In re Brown), 412 F. Supp. 1066, 1068-70 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (citing an
agency relationship with the intentional wrongdoer as a ground for nondischargeability of
the resultant debt); First Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Luce (In re Luce), 109 B.R. 202, 206
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that where a husband and wife were business partners,
the husband's fraudulent acts in his capacity as partner were imputed to the wife, making
her debt nondischargeable); Smith, 98 B.R. at 427 (holding that where the business license
was in the wife's name, debts incurred by a husband's fraudulent acts in his capacity as
an agent were not dischargeable as to the wife); Powell v. Bear, Steams & Co. (In re
Powell), 95 B.RL 236, 240 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 108 B.R. 343 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd,
914 F.2d 268 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding a debtor's liability for his agent's wrongful misstatements in connection with purchase of securities nondischargeable); Fluehr v. Paolino
(In re Paolino), 89 B.R. 453, 461 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding a wife's debt from her
husband's fraud nondischargeable where the husband was his wife's agent); American Inv.
Bank, N.A. v. Hosking (In re Hosking), 89 B.R. 971, 977 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding a debtor's liability for his agent's submission of a fraudulent financial statement
nondischargeable whether or not debtor should have known of the agent's act); Laborers
Clean-up Contract Admin. Trust Fund v. Kay (In re Kay), 60 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1986) (holding a debtor vicariously liable for deceptive statements by business partners and thus denying discharge); Walker v. Citizens Bank (In re Walker), 53 B.R. 174,
181-82 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985), on remand from 726 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding
a debt incurred by the wife/agent's fraud nondischargeable as to debtor/husband); Shelton
v. Wells (In re Shelton), 28 B.R. 218, 222 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983) (finding that husband
and wife were joint venturers and imputing the husband's fraud to his wife); Thorp Credit
& Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 940 (Bankr. D. Mn. 1981)
(holding that because husband and wife operated a farm as partners, the innocent debtor's
liability for the spouse's fraud was nondischargeable); Terminal Builder Mart of Piedmont
v. Warren (In re Warren), 7 B.R. 571, 573 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980) (holding a debtor's
liability for goods fraudulently acquired by a partner nondischargeable); Magana v. Moore
Dev. Corp. (In re Moore), 1 B.R. 52, 53 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979) (holding an innocent
manager's liability for an employee's willful and malicious racial discrimination
nondischargeable); Marine Distrib., Inc. v. Lubbers (In re Lubbers) 5 Collier Bankr. Cas.
(MB) 506, 509 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1975) (denying discharge of debt to partners who had
no knowledge of a fraudulent transaction by their third partner); In re Maloof, 2 F.2d
373, 374 (N.D. Ga. 1924) (holding a debtor wife's liability for the fraud of her husband
who ran her business nondischargeable); A. Sam & Sons Produce Co. v. Campese, 217
N.Y.S.2d 275, 277 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (stating that one partner's fraud resulting in
partnership gain leads to nondischargeability as to both partners); Griffin v. Bergeda, 279
S.W. 385, 386 (Tenm. 1926) (holding that debt incurred by the actual fraud of one's
partner is nondischargeable); George Busby Ford, Inc. v. Ross, 459 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Term.
App. 1970) (whether fraud committed by debtor's partner or salesman, debt
nondischargeable as to innocent debtor); see also Giesinger v. Beleau (In re Beleau), 35
B.R. 259, 262 (Bankr. D. R.IL 1983) (stating that an attorney's misrepresentation is attrib-
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rendering decisions over the past few years, have blunted the impact of the Strang rule in a number of ways. These modern cases
can be divided roughly into two categories: those dealing with
general limitations on the Strang doctrine and those arising specifically in the inter-spousal context.
A.

General Limitations on Strang

Some courts avoided the Strang rule by finding that the malefactor-partner acted outside the scope of the partnership." Thus,
where the wrongdoer was acting for her own personal benefit and
to the detriment of the partnership, the debt was dischargeable." 5
The problem with this argument is that if the malefactor truly acted outside the scope of the partnership, the better construction is
not merely that the debtor's debt should be dischargeable. Rather,
the debtor would not be liable for the wrongdoer's misdeeds even
under nonbankruptcy rules."
As discussed above, some courts have avoided endorsing
Strang by requiring, and finding, that the debtor acted with reckless disregard for the truth. 9 Other courts, however, have simply
rejected the nondischargeability of vicarious debts under section
523(a)(2)(A)
without logically explaining how they circumvent
60
Strang.'
uted to a debtor/client, but noting that the debtor and attorney had requisite fraudulent
intent); Modem Distrib., Inc. v. Gray (In re Gray,) 22 B.R. 676, 680 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1982) (questioning without denying the vitality of Strang, Gray is alternatively cited as
supporting or denying the Strang rule); National Bank of North Am. v. Newmark (In re
Newmark), 20 B.R. 842, 858 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (requiring that, before discharge is
denied, a debtor must be shown to have "intended to deceive; ... [b]eyond mere knowledge, the debtor must . . . have had a 'fraudulent intent or reckless disregard for the
truth tantamont [sic] to wilful misrepresentations'" (quoting Wright v. Lubinko, 515 F.2d
260, 263 (9th Cir. 1975)). But see In re Josephson, 229 F. 272 (D. Or. 1916) (although
sometimes cited as supporting Strang, the court instead assesses the principal's knowledge
of the agent's wrongful acts and actually allows discharge to an inactive partner).
156. Cf. Robles v. Lowther (In re Lowther), 32 B.R. 638, 641-42 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1983) (holding debt dischargeable where evidence showed that an advisor who misrepresented an investment was not the debtor's agent, but acted in his own behalf).
157. See, e.g., In re Schultz, 109 F. 264, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1901) (approving Strang but
finding that a partner who skimmed funds to pay gambling debts, thus defrauding both
his debtor/partner and firm creditors, acted outside the scope of his authority so that liability for the fraud did not attach to the debtor).
158. HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WanjAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 194 (1979) ("acts of a partner not intended to benefit the
business of the partnership do not bind the partnership"); cf. infra notes 181-89.
159. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Sostarich v. Luton (In re Sostarich), 73 B.1L 731, 735 (W.D. Ky. 1987)
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Limitations in Inter-Spousal Context

Courts have long addressed the conditions under which spouses should be treated as partners, or at least as agents for each other. 6 Often this question arises when courts must decide whether
to hold one spouse vicariously responsible for the acts of the other.
A number of courts have adopted approaches allowing an honest
spouse a discharge of debts despite the non-debtor spouse's wrongdoing.

(holding that "[v]icarious liability is not a basis for nondischargeability of a debt under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)" and that "actual fraud" by the principal is required for
nondischargeability); Alden State Bank v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 29 B.R. 184, 191
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (stating, without mentioning Strang or McIntyre, that
nondischargeability of vicarious debt would frustrate the fresh start policy); In re
Rutkowski, 2 B.R. 677, 679 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that there was no proof that
debtor actively participated in a partner's conversion without explaining why such proof
was required); see also cases cited supra note 17.
161. E-g., Arline v. Brown, 190 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1951) (requiring mutual control
over the subject matter in order to label spouses as partners in joint venture); Chocknok
v. State Commercial Fisheries Entry Comn'n, 696 P.2d 669, 675 (Alaska 1985) (requiring
proof of co-ownership to prove partnership between spouses); Remmenga v. Selk, 34
N.W.2d 757, 762 (Neb. 1948) (requiring that spouses have equal rights to direct and
control one another's conduct to prove they are joint venturers); Harington v. Harrington,
742 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. 1987) (examining spouses' intent as a factor in determining
existence of a partnership); Painter v. Lingon, 71 S.E.2d 355, 357 (Va. 1952) (denying
that mere presence of owner in automobile driven by owner's spouse was sufficient to
establish agency relationship between spouses); cf. Leane E. Cerven, Note, The Problem of
the Innocent Co-Insured Spouse: Three Theories on Recovery, 17 VAT. U.L. REV. 849,
857-63 (1983) (discussing traditional treatment of married couple as entity to deny insurance proceeds to innocent spouse when other spouse commits arson); see generally lames,
supra note 72, at 212-14 (criticizing analysis whereby factors in addition to marital relationship, such as one spouse's ownership of property combined with presence when other
spouse uses the property, lead to a conclusion that an agency relationship exists).
162. See, e.g., First Security Bank v. Steinman (In re Steinman), 61 B.R. 368, 374
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding that a judgment may be rendered against the husband
only); Chios v. Klein (In re Klein), 58 B.R. 397, 398 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding a
wife's debt dischargeable where the evidence was insufficient to show she had knowledge
of her husband's scheme to deceive creditors); Band of Knights Booster Club v. Norton
(In re Norton), 34 B.R. 666, 668 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1983) (dismissing a complaint against
a spouse where no evidence was presented as to that spouse's misrepresentation concerning travel deposit refunds); Morris Plan Co. of Iowa v. Benedict (In re Benedict), 15
B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (holding a husband's debt nondischargeable due
to his misrepresentation, but allowing discharge of his wife's debt absent sufficient evidence to implicate her in her husband's wrongdoing); Wilson v. Bursh (In re Bursh), 14
B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981) (refusing to impute an attorney/husband's fraud to
his debtor/wife where she did not commit fraud, despite a community property law which
allows assessment of damages against community property if a tort is committed in interest of the property).
Interestingly, there is one scenario in which the Code clearly calls for a result which
functionally approximates denial of a discharge because of a spouse's wrongdoing. This
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Courts almost uniformly announce that the marital relationship,
by itself, does not give rise to a partnership or agency. 3 The
fact that the law of the relevant state may impute fraud from one
spouse to another, and even impose punitive liability on one spouse
for the acts of the other in certain circumstances, has been found
insufficient
for
the
innocent
spouse's
debts to
be
nondischargeable.I'
After reviewing the facts before it, a court may find that no
agency relationship was established.165 Other courts refuse to impute fraud from one spouse to another even where the facts sugoccurs when a couple lives in a community property state and one spouse files a bankruptcy petition. Ordinarily such a spouse can obtain an injunction under Code § 524(a)(3)
preventing a creditor from seeking recovery from any future acquired community property.
I1 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (1988). Among items typically qualifying as community property is
the debtor's future income. Injunctive relief is perceived as critical to ensuring that the
debtor is afforded a fresh start.
Nonetheless, if a community debt was incurred by the fraud or wrongdoing of the
non-debtor spouse such that the debt would be nondischargeable had the non-debtor
spouse filed bankruptcy, injunctive relief under § 524(a)(3) is unavailable. The creditor is
allowed to collect the debt from all types of community property, including the future
earnings of the innocent debtor/spouse.
163. In re Tarm of North Hills, 116 B.R. 455, 462 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (holding that a wife
was not agent of her husband "strictly by force of the marital relationship ... " (citations omitted)), aff'd 904 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1990); Bradford v. Bentonville Farm Supply,
Inc., 510 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ind. App. 1987) (holding that marriage alone does not create
agency relationship between spouses); see also Chevy Chase F.S.B. v. Hable (In re
Hable), 107 B.R. 356, 359 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding a debt dischargeable where
the creditor could not prove which debtor, husband or wife, fraudulently made credit card
purchases); American Charter Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Harris (In re Harris), 107
B.R. 210, 215 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (finding no evidence that the wife acted as her
husband's agent and holding the husband's acts and omissions not imputable to his wife
by virtue of their marriage); Bentley v. Slavik, 663 F. Supp. 736, 739 (S.D. Ill. 1987)
(holding that where a wife had no ownership in a violin and played no role in its sale,
she could not be held liable for her husband's alleged fraud); First Security Bank v.
Steinman (In re Steinman), 61 B.RL 368, 374 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding evidence
insufficient to show that a wife actually appointed her husband to be her agent); Sur Gro
Plant Food Co. v. Curl (In re Curl), 64 B.R. 14, 18-19 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (finding
no evidence that the husband acted as agent for his wife in executing fraudulent financial
statements without her knowledge).
164. Norton, 34 B.R. at 668 (fraud cannot be imputed to a wife simply based on Arizona community property law) (citing Bursh, 14 B.R. at 706). But see Paolino, 89 B.R.
at 460 (holding that under Pennsylvania law, spouses are presumed to be mutual agents
with regard to entireties property so long as the acts of one spouse are beneficial to beth,
even where one acts without the other's knowledge).
165. See, e.g., Steinman, 61 B.R. at 374 (holding that the wife neither acquiesced in the
specific misrepresentations nor gave her husband "general authority to act for her in signing the financial statement," although her husband made written fraudulent representations
to bank in connection with loan to husband and the wife knew that husband would be
making certain representations to bank).
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gest that an agency relationship at least arguably exists. These
cases cover diverse fact patterns, including situations in which
spouses jointly borrow money or sell jointly-owned property."s
Because these opinions usually mention neither Strang nor specific
concepts of agency or partnership law, it is unclear whether they
are based on a lack of agency or on a rule of law contrary to
Strang. Other courts, in many of these same scenarios, apply
1
Strang. 67

166. E.g., FDIC v. Figge (In re Figge), 94 B.R. 654, 670 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988)
(holding that although a wife signed loan documents and knew or should have known
that she and her husband, as guarantors, could not afford interest payments on the loans,
and although she attended at least one investor meeting, "[h]er role .. . was too peripheral to warrant a determination that the debt is ... nondischargeable . . . "); North

Shore Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Jones (In re Jones), 88 B.R. 899, 903 (Bankr. E.D. wis.
1988) (holding that although the wife signed a false security agreement and loan application, her debt was dischargeable where there was no evidence that she, as opposed to
husband, had fraudulent intent); Leone v. Shane (In re Shane), 80 B.R. 240, 243 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding a wife's debt dischargeable despite her husband's fraudulent misrepresentation to purchasers in a sale of jointly held property); Chios v. Klein (In re
Klein), 58 B.R. 397, 398 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that although the wife guaranteed a loan for her husband's business, the wife's debt was dischargeable despite her
husband's fraud in the loan documents she had signed); Cash v. Armstrong (In re
Armstrong), 54 B.R. 399, 409 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985) (finding that although husband
and wife sold jointly held property, the husband's knowledge was not imputable to his
wife); First Nat'l Bank v. Curry (In re Curry), 12 B.R. 421, 424-25 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1981) (holding that a husband's debt was dischargeable although his wife fraudulently
arranged for the loan); Morris Plan Co. v. Benedict (In re Benedict), 15 B.R. 671, 675
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (holding a wife's debt dischargeable despite her husband's fraud
in obtaining jointly secured loan); cf.Norton, 34 B.R. at 668 (holding a husband's fraudulent representation in the operation of a jointly owned travel agency was not imputable
to wife).
167. See, e.g., First Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Luce (In re Luce), 109 B.R. 202, 206
(Bankr. NJ). Tex. 1989) (holding a husband's fraud imputable to his wife where the
spouses were business partners, even though they worked in separate areas of the business); Love v. Smith (In re Smith), 98 B.R. 423, 426 (Bankr. C.D. III. 1989) (holding a
husband's fraud imputable to his wife because, although the wife made no business decisions, the license required to do business was in her name and she allowed her husband
to operate the business); Paolino, 89 B.R. at 460 (holding that where a wife told her
husband to "go forward as he saw fit" in a transaction involving entireties property and
where there is a state law presumption of agency, the wife's debt was nondischargeable);
Shelton v. Wells (In re Shelton), 28 B.R. 218, 222 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983) (holding a
husband's fraud imputable to wife where an exchange of jointly owned property with
third parties benefited both, since as a joint venturer, her lack of participation in negotiations was irrelevant); Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Ponmerer (In re Pommerer), 10 B.R.
935, 940 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (finding that because husband and wife debtors "do not
contend that a husband-wife agency relationship did not exist" in connection with their
farming operations, the innocent wife's liability for her spouse's fraud was
nondischargeable); In re Maloof, 2 F.2d 373, 374 (N.D. Ga. 1924) (holding that a debtor/wife's liability for the fraud of her husband, who ran her business, was
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At least one court has suggested a minor limitation to the
Strang rule. This standard would impute fraud only if the "innocent" spouse had personally participated, even if with honest intent,
in the underlying transaction.) The same court held that a higher standard of involvement would be necessary to impute willful
and malicious conduct under section 523(a)(6).169 All of the criticisms raised against the Strang rule apply to this modified rule as
well.
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A reasonable case can be made for judicial rejection of the

Strang doctrine. Part V(A) states and evaluates this case. However,
perhaps the greatest hope for effective, uniform change is through
corrective legislation.170 Part V(B) proposes specific statutory
amendments to accomplish this goal.
A.

The Case for Judicial Rejection of Strang

The largest obstacle to judicial repudiation of the Strang doctrine is that neither the legislative history of section 523(a)(2) nor
case law prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978
contains any express rejection of Strang. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stressed that a change in statutory construction must be
clearly corroborated by Congressional intent.17 ' To overrule
nondischargeable).
168. Figge, 94 B.R. at 669-70 (holding a wife's debt dischargeable where she played
only a "peripheral" role in her husband's fraudulent misrepresentations in a loan application (construing In re Lansford, 822 F. 2d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 1987), in which the court
held a wife's debt nondischargeable after finding she had participated in her husband's
fraudulent transaction)).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., BancBoston Mortgage Corp. v. Ledford (In re Ledford), 127 B.R. 175
(M.D. Tenn. 1991) (indicating that uniformity by judicial construction should follow
Strang); Paolino, 75 B.R. at 649 (stressing that old Supreme Court precedents retain validity until Congress indicates clearly that legislative changes are intended to alter those
precedents and suggesting Strang must be changed legislatively).
171. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 111 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (1990)
(declaring "we will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure"); Square D Co. v. Niagar Frontier Tariff Bureau Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986) (stating there is a "strong presumption of continued validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute [so
that] overruling of a [judicially-created] rule . . . must come from Congress"); Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) (stating that
"[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific
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Strang, the Court would have to find a clear expression of Congressional intent to do so in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978."
1. The Plain Language Argument
The best case against Strang begins with the plain language of
the exceptions to discharge under sections 523(a)(2)(B), 523(a)(6),
and 523(a)(9). This language applies to liabilities arising from the
debtor's own acts, and should not extend to vicarious liability for
the acts of others.173
Section 523(a)(2)(A) must be similarly construed in light of
the apparent Congressional intention set forth in sections
523(a)(2)(B), 523(a)(6), and 523(a)(9). As argued in Part me(F), 174
there is no policy basis for denying discharge for an innocent
debtor's vicariously acquired debt under section 523(a)(2)(A) while
allowing discharge for similar debts governed by related sections.
Moreover, the objection raised to the "plain language" argument in
Part IlH(F) becomes inapposite in this context. While the earlier
discussion argued that reliance on the plain language of sections
523(a)(2)(B), 523(a)(6), and 523(a)(9) was an unreasonable basis
for preferential treatment of debts under those sections, it does not
follow that uniform treatment requires uniform denial of discharge.
Instead, the uniform rule should grant a discharge.
In addition, one of the primary objections to the plain language argument raised in Part I1(F) relies upon Strang's primitive
conceptualization of partnerships as multi-handed monoliths. Under
this concept of partnership, the plain language of the statute applies
equally to acts personally performed by the debtor and those she

....
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of
bankruptcy codifications")
172. See Ledford, 127 B.R. at 184 (citing doctrine requiring clear expression of congressional intent to change statutory interpretation); Paolino, 75 B.R. at 649 (explaining
that the Supreme Court has emphasized the rule of construction that if Congress intends
to alter a statutory interpretation of long standing, it must do so expressly). The Paolino
court cited as authority for this proposition Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), which
held that a general acceptance of the judicial exception for the restitutionary obligations of
convicted criminals supported a presumption of Congressional intent that such debts remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), and Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S.
494, which held that Congress, in codifying a rule of abandonment, did not intend to
allow a trustee's abandonment power to supercede legitimate state interests in public safety.
173. See Thatcher v. Austin (In re Austin), 36 B.R. 306 (Bankr. M.D. Tenm. 1984)
(discussing legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 121-47.
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performs vicariously through her partners.175 One might reasonably argue, however, that in enacting the Bankruptcy Code of
1978, Congress viewed partnerships as aggregates of individuals, a
perspective better tailored to the Code's fresh start policies. The
Code's legislative history, which constantly repeats the fresh start
theme, provides adequate authority that Congress sought to distinguish between a debtor's liabilities for her own, direct acts and her
indirect, vicarious liabilities. 76 Under this aggregate view of partnership, the plain language of sections 523(a)(2)(B), 523(a)(6), and
523(a)(9) refers only to the debtor's personal actions.
Aside from the evidence available from legislative history,
other evidence supports the idea that the applicable partnership
model has changed from the one which underlies Strang. During
the century and more since Strang was published, a number of
legal fictions similar to that of the monolithic partnership model
have been widely rejected. For example, the fictions treating husband and wife as an entity for purposes of interspousal tort immunity or testimonial privilege have been widely discredited. 1"

175. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Austin, 36 B.R. 306 (discussing legislative history).
177. Courts eliminating interspousal tort immunity, or limiting it to specific torts, generally find the legal fiction portraying husband and wife as an entity to be no longer
supported by public policy. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70,,72 (Cal. 1962) (finding public policy support for interspousal tort immunity, based on fear of fraud or collusive suits, outweighed by public policy favoring compensation to legitimately injured
plaintiffs); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 521 (Md. 1983) (abrogating interspousal tort
immunity because traditional policy justifications are inadequate to overcome policy favoring recovery in modem social context); Cain v. McKinnon, 552 So.2d 91, 92-93 (Miss.
1989) (balancing interests of parties to apply elimination of interspousal tort immunity
retroactively); Bums v. Bums, 518 So.2d 1205, 1210-11 (Miss. 1988) (eliminating
interspousal tort immunity based on principle that for every wrong there is a remedy, and
finding the "unity" of husband and wife to be a legal fiction disproportionately harmful to
wives); Heino v. Harper, 759 P.2d 253, 263 (Or. 1988) (abolishing interspousal tort immunity for negligent torts because preserving it in such a limited context was "neither
symmetrical nor otherwise rational . . . ."); Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 868 (Pa. 1981)
(finding policy bases for interspousal immunity doctrine inconsistent and no longer applicable); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Wyo. 1987) (rejecting notions that
preservation of family harmony and prevention of insurance fraud offer support for continued application of interspousal tort immunity). But see, e.g., Saunders v. Hill, 202 A.2d
807, 810 (Del. 1964) (denying wrongful death claim by wife's estate because cause of
action in tort would be barred if wife had survived accident caused by husband's negligence); Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126, 1130 (Fla. 1988) (recognizing limits on
interspousal tort immunity in cases where one spouse is deceased, but upholding doctrine
in other contexts, and barring wife's claim against husband's estate based on application
of New York insurance law); Treciak v. Treciak, 547 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (barring insurer's claim, as husband's subrogee, against wife for fire damage result-
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The Policy Argument

Should the plain language argument fail, courts,1 78 in order
to avoid Strang, would probably have to identify Strang's policy or
doctrinal basis and explain that fundamental changes warrant the
opinion's reversal." 9 Thus, one might argue that Strang was

ing from wife's negligence, even though husband and wife were separated at time claim
arose and subsequently divorced).
Interspousal testimonial privilege existed based on the premise that, ike liability in
tort between spouses, denial of such a privilege would lead to marital discord.
See
Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958) ("The rule rested maily on a desire to
foster peace in the family.. . ."). In Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), the
Court limited the privilege to the testifying spouse, affirming the Court of Appeals' rejection of defendant's assertion of the privilege. The Court recognized a growing trend in
state legislatures and courts to limit the doctrine, once an absolute disqualification, to a
privilege protecting only private marital communications, and in some cases eliminating
the doctrine entirely. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5913 (Supp. 1991) (granting a
waivable privilege to the witness-spouse, except in proceedings for desertion and maintenance, in criminal cases involving violence or bodily injury to either spouse or children in
their custody, in bigamy cases, murder, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, or rape,
where no privilege is allowed); Estes v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 421, 424-25 (Ky.
1988) (holding spouses competent to testify for or against each other, but denying permission to compel such testimony); State v. Hamuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 676-77 (Mlinn.
1990) (refusing to extend privilege beyond actual communications between spouses and
balancing policy favoring protecting marital harmony with need for jury access to all relevant facts in criminal cases); State v. Santora, 552 A.2d 184, 187 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988) (allowing defendants to compel spousal testimony in criminal cases); Gibbons
v. State, 794 S.W.2d 887, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (holding voluntary testimony by
defendant's spouse admissible over defendant's objection, but denying prosecution right to
compel such testimony by unwilling spouse). But see In re Marriage of Bozarth, 779
P.2d 1346, 1350-51 (Colo. 1989) (holding current husband's testimony as to wife's treatment of child precluded by interspousal privilege in custody dispute between wife and
previous husband); People v. Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d 43, 48 (Mich. 1989) (upholding right
of defendant to withhold consent to testimony by ex-spouse regarding marital communications); State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (finding that
interspousal testimonial privilege is waivable only by defendant spouse, although allowing
spouse's testimony to stand under harmless error doctrine where such testimony was
merely cumulative); State v. Robinson, 376 S.E.2d 606, 610 (W. Va. 1988) (holding
interspousal testimonial privilege prohibits testimony by defendant's spouse regarding acts
performed in reliance on confidential nature of marital relationship).
178. Many lower courts may in any event be reluctant to take such a drastic a step,
given that Strang was decided by the Supreme Court.
179. I am reminded of the comment of Parlee, supra note 111, at 32 n.32, ridiculing a
court which "offered the dubious rationale that 'the doctrine [imposing punitive damages
vicariously on an innocent principal] is too deeply implanted in the law to be uprooted
for no better reason than that it is illogical.'" See generally, Patricia K. Fenske, Note,
Oregon's Hostility to Policy Arguments: Heino v. Harper and the Abolition of Interspousal
Immunity, 68 OR. L. REV. 197 (1989) (discussing factors considered by Oregon Supreme
Court in determining whether to reverse nonstatutory rule or common law doctrine).
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based on an, outdated version of the nonbankruptcy doctrine of
vicarious liability. The problem with that assertion is that although
there has been substantial development in the law of vicarious liability, the change is probably not enough to reverse Strang.
As has already been discussed, the denial of a discharge is
punitive in nature. Therefore, the policies behind the
nondischargeability of vicarious debt should be similar to those
supporting the imposition of punitive damages on persons who are
vicariously liable. Rules regarding the imposition of punitive damages based on vicarious liability have become more restrictive.
Arguably, the policy considerations-and conceptualization of agency-underlying this restrictive trend would also justify more restrictive rules regarding the nondischargeability of vicarious debt.
At the end of the last century, a substantial minority view
held that a principal could be vicariously liable for punitive damages under the "scope of employment rule" without having done anything wrong. Punitive damages could be vicariously imposed on a
principal for any actions taken by the agent within the scope of the
agent's employment.'O Subsequently, the Restatement (Second) of

180. A number of authorities argue that this was, or is, the majority vi'ew. See, e.g.,
Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Iowa 1983) (citing authorities which identify the
scope of employment rule as the majority view); KEFTON et al., supra note 60, § 2, at
13 (a majority of jurisdictions retain the rule that "the vicarious liability of the master for
acts within the scope of the employment extends to punitive as well as compensatory
damages"); Parlee, supra note 111, at 27 n.2 ("[t]he scope of employment rule, long the
majority rule, is now followed in a minority of jurisdictions"). The remaining
jurisdisctions adhere to some form of the "complicity rule." Stem & Loughhead, supra
note 111, at 30. Most authorities, however, generally agree that the modem trend is toward the more restrictive "complicity rule." See, e.g., Briner, 337 N.W.2d at 867 (adopting the complicity rule as more consistent with the purpose of punitive damages and
noting that other jurisdictions, such as Florida and Wyoming, had recently done so); Kline
v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 666 P.2d 711, 716 (Kan. 1983) (adopting complicity
rule); Parlee, supra note 111, at 27 n.2 ("[t]he Restatement [complicity] rule ... has now

become the rule in most jurisdictions).
According to Parlee, id at 31 n.27, the following jurisdictions continue to apply the
older scope of employment rule, which allows punitive damages for vicarious liability
even if the principal was not guilty of wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Avondale Mills v.
Bryant, 63 So. 932, 934 (Ala. Ct. App. 1913) (holding employer liable for punitive damages for foreman's assault and battery of laborer); Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 452
P.2d 117, 120 (Ariz.- Ct. App. 1969) (holding corporation liable for punitive damages
where employees acted with reckless indifference to plaintiffs' interests); Ray Dodge, Inc.
v. Moore, 479 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Ark. 1972) (holding auto dealer liable for punitive damages in sale of truck with falsified odometer whether or not he knew of and ratified
employee's wrongful action resetting the odometer); Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. General Warehouse No. Two, Inc., 149 S.E.2d 72, 74 (Ga. 1966) (awarding punitive damages
against corporation whose agent maliciously diverted stream, damaging plaintiff's property);
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Torts formalized a different general rule, based on developing case
law. This rule, known as the "complicity rule," is usually described as preventing the vicarious imposition of punitive damages
unless the principal did something wrong."' However, where a

Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. 1977) (holding evidence
of agents' fraud, malice, gross negligence, and breach of warranty sufficient to support
punitive damage award against auto dealer-principal); Kiser v. Neumann Co. Contractors,
Inc., 426 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Ky. 1967) (noting that employer's punitive damage liability is
derivative and refusing to hold corporation liable for punitive damages when none were
assessed against the employee); Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 202 (1869)
(awarding damages against railway company who knowingly retained an employee who
assaulted a passenger); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 122 A.2d 457, 462 (Md. 1956)
(dismissing employer's objection that without proof of employer's actual malice, it could
not be held liable for agent's actions of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment);
Lucas v. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co., 56 N.W. 1039, 1040-41 (Mich. 1893) (holding that
railway company can be held liable in exemplary damages for conductor's oppressive
ejectment of passenger because such conduct is within scope of conductor's authority);
Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 71 So.2d 752, 758 (Miss. 1954) (approving award of punitive
damages against oil company for employee's negligent acts which resulted in death of
young girl); Johnson v. Allen, 448 S.W.2d 265, 269-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (holding
employer liable for actions of employees who were acting within the scope of their employment when they installed the wrong transmission and told the customer otherwise);
Rickman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 227 P.2d 607, 613 (Mont. 1951) (holding corporation
liable for agent's acts even though outside the scope of agent's duties, because the corporation had ratified the agent's acts); Hairston v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 18 S.E.2d 166,
170 (N.C. 1942) (allowing punitive damages against bus company for assault against
customer by bus company employee, but remanding on other grounds); Kurn v. Radencic,
141 P.2d 580, 582 (Okla. 1943) (citing with approval the scope of employment rule, but
deciding case on grounds that employer retained employee while knowing of his tendency
to use unnecessary force and violence toward third parties in the course of his employment); Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790, 794 (Ore. 1975) (adopting scope
of employment rule and holding restaurant liable for punitive damages for malicious prosecution although there was evidence that the cook's conduct was directed by restaurant
management); Philadelphia Traction Co. v. Orbann, 12 A. 816, 820-21 (Pa. 1888) (noting
that if the conductor's action was malicious, railroad company would be liable for exemplary damages); Hooper v. Hutto, 158 S.E. 726, 727 (S.C. 1931) (overruling defendant's
exception to punitive damages for its employee's recklessness while driving a truck within
the scope of his employment); Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526, 534 (Tenn. 1974) (holding newspaper liable for punitive damages for its reporters' conspiracy to make false reports of an attorney indecently exposing himself publicly).
181. The Restatement provides:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other
principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or managerial agent authorized the doing and the
manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was
reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting
in the scope of employment, or
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(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.
REsTATEmET (SECOND) Op TORTS, § 909 (1979).
The more modem rule has been referred to as the "some fault" or "complicity" rule.
This rule has been applied in the following jurisdictions, as noted in Parlee, supra note
111, at 36 n.49: MINN. STAT. § 549.20(2) (1990); Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 6970 (Cal. 1979) (noting that even if defendants' exception to jury instruction had been
sustained, their liability would be the same since the employees at fault acted in a managerial capacity within the scope of their employment); Frick v. Abell, 602 P.2d 852, 856
(Colo. 1979) (refusing to require a municipality to indemnify a police officer for exemplary damages because the municipality's retention of the officer did not constitute ratification of his tortious conduct); Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia of Danbury, 42 A. 67,
70 (Conn. 1899) (holding that a corporation is not liable for the malicious conduct of its
manager); Dart Drug, Inc. v. Linthicum, 300 A.2d 442, 444 (D.C. 1973) (holding that a
store was not liable for punitive damages for a false arrest by the store detective where
the store manager freed the plaintiff); Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d
545, 547 (Fla. 1981) (finding no corporate liability for a wrongful death where the plaintiff did not allege fault on the part of the corporate employer); Lauer v. YMCA, 557
P.2d 1334, 1335 (Haw. 1976) (noting as a matter of public policy that city is not liable
for police officer's misconduct absent authorization or condoning such conduct); Openshaw
v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 929, 932 (Idaho 1971) (holding insurer not liable for
punitive damages absent showing that insurer's manager ratified subordinate's acts); Holda
v. Kane County, 410 N.E.2d 552, 563 (11. App. Ct. 1980) (holding county not liable for
punitive damages for the willful misconduct of its jailers); Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d
858, 868 (Iowa 1983) (holding employer liable for punitive damages where employer
allowed employee to drive for an excessive period of time); Kline 'v. Multi-Media
Cablevision, Inc., 666 P.2d 711, 716 (Kan. 1983) (adopting the Restatement rule and finding corporation not liable for employee's tort unless corporation authorized the act or was
reckless in employing or retaining the employee); Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 607 P.2d
569, 575 (Nev. 1980) (requiring principal to have knowledge of agent's wrongful conduct,
combined with authorization or ratification of that conduct, before vicarious liability for

punitive damages may be imposed); Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman
Assoc., Inc., 260 A.2d 248, 254 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (holding real estate
broker liable for punitive damages where broker attempted to defend agent's actions and
sought benefit of agent's illegal transaction, thus ratifying agent's misconduct); Samadon
Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 577 P.2d 1245, 1249 (N.M. 1978) (holding gas well owner not vicariously liable for employee's negligent design of safety vent system which caused death of
plaintiff's decedent); Craven v. Bloomingdale, 64 N.E. 169, 169 (N.Y. 1902) (reversing
trial court where jury instruction was given which allowed punitive damages against employer for false imprisonment by employee without additional jury instruction requiring
finding an authorization or ratification of employee's actions); John Deere Co. v. Nygard
Equipment, Inc., 225 N.W.2d 80, 95 (NJ). 1974) (finding employee's authority sufficient
to allow him to act for the corporation, so that his wrongful act was the wrongful act of
the corporation justifying assessment of punitive damages, but noting such damages would
be inappropriate absent authorization); Tracy y. Athens & Pomeroy Coal & Land Co., 152
N.E. 641, 642 (Ohio 1926) (holding company superintendant's intent to remove coal from
plaintiff's land not imputable to company for purposes of liability for punitive damages);
Conti v. Walter Winters, Inc. 136 A.2d 622, 624 (RL 1957) (finding deceptive conduct
was authorized by management and holding auto dealership liable for punitive damages);
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Tex. 1967) (holding hotel
liable for punitive damages when manager commits assault and battery while acting in
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principal has acted wrongfully to any degree, punitive damages
may be allowed even when the principal's wrong is less egregious
than that which would ordinarily warrant punitive damages.'2
Many jurisdictions, possibly a new majority, have adopted the
Restatement position.183 The limited ability to impose vicarious
punitive damages arguably reflects the fact that the agent's wrong-

managerial capacity); Freeman v. Sproles, 131 S.E.2d 410, 414 (Va. 1963) (requiring
authorization of agent's wrongful conduct in order to award punitive damages against
corporate principal); Shortle v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 399 A.2d 517, 518-19 (Vt.
1979) (holding customers not entitled to punitive damage award where utility employees
negligently disconnected service absent showing of malicious act by governing officer);
Addair v. Huffman, 195 S.E.2d 739, 740 (W. Va. 1973) (holding collection agency liable
for punitive damages where agency exclusively employed justice of the peace Imown to
be incompetent); Garcia v. Sampson's, Inc., 103 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Wis. 1960) (requiring
ratification of employee's tortious conduct in order to impose punitive damage award on
employer); Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1125, 1127 (Wyo. 1981) (reversing trial
court's punitive damage award against employer and adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
rule for determining liability).
It should be noted that the dicta in several of the cases cited by Parlee suggest that
the application of either rule would often produce the same result. See, e.g., Maisenbacker
v. Society Concordia of Danbury, 42 A. 67, 70 (Conn. 1899); Piedmont Cotton Mills,
Inc. v. General Warehouse No. Two, Inc., 149 S.E.2d 72, 74 (Ga. 1866); Stroud v.
Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790, 794 (Ore. 1975).
The law in a few jurisdictions is more restrictive than the complicity rule. See
Briner, 337 N.W.2d at 863-864 (citing jurisdictions).
182. See Parlee, supra note 111, at 38-39, 46 (noting that, when agents are employed in
managerial capacities, principals may be vicariously liable for punitive damages when the
agents' intentional wrongs fall within the scope of employment). Substantial authority
provides that punitive damage awards against vicariously liable principals need not equal
the awards against their agents. See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 973 (Md.
1982) (holding punitive damages for defamation may be apportioned between employee
radio broadcaster and vicariously liable employer radio station). Because the purpose of
exemplary damages is to punish wrongdoers, punitive damages should be apportioned in
accordance with the respective culpability of the various defendants. These cases explain
that such apportionment is essential to the punitive purpose of exemplary damages. See,
e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) ("Because
of the exemplary nature of punitive damages . . . punitive or exemplary damages may be
awarded in different amounts against several defendants or they may be awarded against
one or more of the defendants and not others, depending, not upon the damages sustained
by the plaintiff, but upon the differing degree of culpability or the existence or nonexistence of malice on the part of the defendants." (citing Embrey, 442 A.2d 966)). See
generally D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Apportionment of Puntive or Exemplary Damages as
Between Joint Tortfeasors, 20 A.L.R.3d 666.
183. For contrasting views at slightly different periods of time, compare Parlee, supra
note 111, at 36 ("The majority of jurisdictions follow the rule that a principal cannot be
held vicariously liable for punitive damages assessed against an agent unless the
principal's conduct, in relation to the agent's, was itself somehow wrongful." (footnote
omitted)) with Embrey, 442 A.2d at 969 (finding that a majority of jurisdictions hold employers vicariously liable for punitive damages against employees).
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doing is not attributed to the principal.
A major flaw in this reasoning is that even under the Restatement rule, punitive damages may sometimes be imposed vicariously
upon an innocent principal for the fraud of her agent. According to
section 909(c) of the Restatement, "[plunitive damages can properly
be awarded against a ... principal because of an act by an agent
if, but only if, ... the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment. . . ."" The Restatement recognizes that persons in positions of discretion, such as
managers, generally have the power intentionally to cause injury to
third parties. The Restatement retains the vicarious liability rule to
motivate principals to exercise great care in the selection of such
persons."
Given that the modem trend does not limit the imposition of punitive damages where agents occupy and act in managerial capacities, the trend does not support reversal of the Strang
rule in those cases. 8 '
A partner is typically entitled to exercise certain managerial
powers. 1" Consequently, if the Restatement rule applies, it seems
that punitive damages could be imposed vicariously. Interestingly,
however, a separate rule seems to regulate vicarious imposition of
punitive damages on innocent partners, as opposed to non-partner
principals.18 There is no clear trend as to the restrictiveness of

184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(c) (1979).
185. The principal's liability is still only imputed liability, because she is liable even if
she was neither reckless nor negligent in hiring or maintaining the employee.
186. Note, however, not all positions involving the exercise of discretion have been
characterized as managerial capacities. See, e.g., Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 117 Cal.
Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that the trial judge was correct in holding that a
defendant, although a supervisor, was not a manager within the definition of Restatement
§ 909); Kimmel v. Iowa Realty Co., Inc., 339 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Iowa 1983) (stating that
real estate agent did not occupy managerial capacity for broker).
187. See UNiF. PARTNERsHip ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) ("All partners have
equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business.").
188. No persuasive policy has been suggested to explain these disparate rules. Some
courts have held that punitive damages cannot be vicariously imposed on a passive partner unless -that partner authorized or ratified the wrongdoing. I BROMBERG & RIBSTEN,
supra note 80, § 4.07, at 4:91-92; REUSCH.EIN & GREGORY, supra note 158, § 203; see
generally, Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Derivitive Liability of Partnerfor Punitive
Damages for Wrongful Act of Copartner, 14 A.L.R.4th 1335 (1982). However, a rule
which shields innocent partners from vicarious punitive damages is inconsistent with the
rule imposing on principals for the acts of managerial agents. I BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 80, § 4.07, at 4:91. Other courts have imposed vicarious liability for punitive
damages, but limited the extent of the passive partner's liability because that partner's
conduct was relatively less culpable. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hall v. Cook, 400 S.W.2d
39, 41-42 (Mo. 1966) (holding that punitive damage judgments in differing amounts could
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this separate rule."8 9 Consequently, no definitive lesson can be
gleaned from these partnership punitive damage rules relative to
Strang, which applies both to partners and non-partner
principals."'
B. Legislative Change
Legislation would be the clearest, most efficient method of
introducing change, and it could take either of at least two forms.
One approach would be to mimic the Restatement rule. This would
continue to render nondischargeable certain vicariously acquired
debts, even where the debtor did not herself commit the type of
conduct which would ordinarily be nondischargeable. It seems that
little good could be said about such an unprincipled compromise.
Fundamental fairness and bankruptcy's "fresh start" policy
require that clear legislation be enacted to provide a discharge to
honest debtors for vicarious liability for another's wrongdoing. This
could be accomplished in two ways. First, the following provision
should be added to every subsection of the Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) 191 dealing with a type of debtor misconduct:
Nondischargeability pursuant to this Subsection may be
based only on the action or inaction of the debtor and not
on the action or inaction of another person vicariously
attributed to the debtor; except, however, that if a debtor
has conspired in or otherwise knowingly assisted in an action-or has authorized or ratified an action"9 which, had

be entered against various defendant partners in a real estate partnership based on their
relative culpability and wealth). This result is consistent with cases allowing apportionment
of punitive damages among vicariously liable principals and agent wrongdoers. See supra
note 182.
189. Compare Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 974 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (approving apportionment of punitive damages between defendants* in principal-agent relationship) with Blue v. Rose, 786 F.2d 349, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding partners jointly
and severally liable for punitive damages). Note, however, that the Eighth Circuit cited
State er reL Hall v. Cook, 400 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1966), in support of its conclusion even
though Cook approved apportionment.
190. Although Strang, involved a partnership, Strang has been applied to non-partnership
agencies as well. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 166.
191. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). As discussed supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text, case
law establishes that such vicarious liability is not a bar to a global discharge under 11
U.S.C. § 727. Nonetheless, possible confusion might be avoided by adding the proposed
language to appropriate subsections of § 727 as well.
192. This proposal assumes that ratification involves morally culpable conduct which
should be punished and deterred.
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the debtor directly performed the action, would have rendered the debtor's resulting debt nondischargeable, such
debt shall be nondischargeable.
The foregoing amendment would substantially remedy the problems arising in the spousal context as well.1" However, this language would not prevent courts from finding that debtors had
committed fraud by blindly relying on information supplied by
their partners or spouses. As discussed above, some courts have
employed the concept of "reckless disregard" or "reckless indifference" for the truth to capture such debtors, even though they may
have been guilty of mere negligence.194 To ensure that the
dischargeability rules are construed and applied in the manner intended, the following language should be added to section
523(a)(2):
No person shall be deemed to have acted with "reckless
disregard for the truth" where such person relied in good
faith upon information supplied by another. Reliance on
information supplied by another shall be presumed to have
been in good faith unless the person allegedly so relying
can be shown to have had substantial reason to doubt the
veracity of the person who provided the information and
then made no good faith effort to dispel the doubt or verify the information.
Although these proposed statutory amendments should provide
substantial protection in the spousal context, they are arguably
insufficient. There may be cases in which debtors, because of
complex psychological, emotional and financial attachments to their
spouses, feel compelled to comply blindly with their spouses'
fraudulent directions or to "rely" on their spouses' obviously
falacios facts. In extreme cases, traditional legal doctrines such as
incompetence or duress may protect the debtor from losing her discharge. The possibly problematic cases are those in which substantial, but arguably not overwhelming, pressure is subjectively
experienced.
Of course, any spousal exception to the

193. If a debtor spouse knew of her spouse's wrongdoing and participated in or contributed to it, even by failing to disclose material facts, the debtor spouse would be personally liable based on her own wrongdoing and the debt would still be nondischargeable.
194. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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nondischargeability rules may be abused by dishonest debtors.
Before exploring the contours of any such exception, it would be
helpful to measure the extent to which spouses in fact experience
substantial compulsion. Devising an appropriate empirical study,
however, lies outside the purview of this article.
CONCLUSION
The Strang doctrine serves no significant public policy Without providing any meaningful deterrent not already produced by
nonbankruptcy vicarious liability rules, Strang unfairly and imprudently frustrates bankruptcy's fresh start policy by denying discharge of vicariously incurred fraudulent debts. The Code mconsistently discharges those who are vicariously liable for other sorts of
nondischargeable debts.
Public policy and equity require rejection of Strang. The Code
may be sufficiently flexible to allow courts to distinguish Strang
and discharge these debts. If the courts continue to refuse this
route, however, section 523 should be explicitly revised and Strang
reversed.

